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CERTIFIED QUESTION
Under Tenth Circuit decisions at the time Gerardo Thomas Garza filed his
complaint, approximately two years remained in limitations period. A Supreme
Court decision soon after filing, however, overturned those decisions and rendered
his complaint approximately ten months late. Under Utah law, does an
intervening change in controlling law merit equitable tolling under these
circumstances?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

NATURE OF THE CASE
Mr. Garza seeks damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 from Officer Burnett, an

Ogden City Police Officer, for an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of
Mr. Garza's Fourth Amendment rights. Mr. Garza's claim arises from Officer
Burnett's involvement in a warrantless search of Mr. Garza's hotel room on April
19, 2002. While conducting the warrantless search, the officers saw that Mr. Garza
possessed a firearm. After Mr. Garza was taken into custody, the officers found
some methamphetamine. Mr. Garza was charged and convicted of possession of
methamphetamine and possession of a firearm by a felon in the United States
District Court for the District of Utah. He served 31 months in prison before the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed his conviction based
on the illegal February 2, 2005 search. Mr. Garza's appeal addresses whether his
§ 1983 claims are barred by Utah's four-year statute of limitations.

15132496.4
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II.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
On October 25, 2006, Mr. Garza filed his original pro se complaint alleging

claims under § 1983 against the United States for violations of his Fourth and
Eighth Amendment rights. (Appellant's Supp. Appx. at 1-18.) On April 5, 2007,
Mr. Garza filed a separate pro se complaint, alleging a § 1983 claim against
Officer Burnett based on the violation of Mr. Garza's Fourth Amendment rights.1
(Appx. at 1-10.) On August 28, 2008, the federal district court dismissed Mr.
Garza's claim against the United States on sovereign immunity grounds.
(Appellant's Supp. Appx. at 19-21.) On February 11, 2009, the district court
granted Mr. Garza's motion for appointment of counsel and instructed appointed
counsel to review Mr. Garza's pending cases "to determine whether they allege
any viable claims and, if so, whether they can be consolidated into a single case."
(Appellant's Supp. Appx. at 25.) On May 12, 2009, Mr. Garza's appointed
counsel filed a motion to consolidate and a proposed amended complaint.
(Appellant's Supp. Appx. 27-41.)
On June 29, 2009, the court entered an order consolidating the cases and
granting Mr. Garza leave to amend his complaint. (Appellant's Supp. Appx. at
42-45.) Mr. Garza filed an amended complaint on June 30, 2009, alleging § 1983

1

Because Mr. Garza's complaint was received by the court on February 16, 2007,
along with his motion to proceed in forma pauperis, Mr. Garza's complaint is
treated as filed on February 16, 2007. See Garza v. Burnett, 672 F.3d 1217, 1219
n.l (10th Cir. 2012).
15132496.4
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claims against Officer Barnett for violation of his Fourth Amendment rights and
various John Does for violation of his Eighth Amendment rights and for violation
of the Unnecessary Rigor clause of the Utah Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 9. (Appx. at
69-77.) Officer Burnett moved for summary judgment on the ground that Mr.
Garza's claims are barred by the statute of limitations. (Appx. at 14-45.) The
district court agreed and granted Officer Burnett's motion on March 23, 2010.
(Appx. at 134-56.)
In its memorandum decision, the district court explained that under the law
as it existed when Mr. Garza was convicted, a § 1983 claim was not cognizable if
it would render invalid a plaintiffs conviction or sentence. Heck v. Humphrey,
512 U.S. 477 (1994). (Appx. at 138.) The Tenth Circuit had construed Heck to
apply to both extant and anticipated future convictions, so that "§ 1983 claims that
might impugn an anticipated future conviction were deemed not to accrue so long
as the potential for a judgment in the pending criminal prosecution continued to
exist." (Appx. at 140.) Therefore, under the Heck case, which was governing
precedent in this Circuit when Garza was convicted, the statute of limitations was
not running on his § 1983 claims until his conviction was overturned.
However, in the February 20, 2007 decision of Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S.
384 (2007), the United States Supreme Court rejected this rule and held that
Heck's deferred accrual applies only when success in a § 1983 action would
impugn an extant conviction. (Appx. at 141.) The district court in Mr. Garza's
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case applied Wallace to the facts and concluded that Mr. Garza's § 1983 search
and seizure claim accrued on the date of the challenged search, April 19, 2002.
(Appx. at 141.) Because Mr. Garza had no outstanding conviction at that time, the
statute of limitations began to accrue in April of 2002, and was not tolled under
federal law by his later conviction. Therefore, his claim was not timely filed under
the applicable statute of limitations. (Appx. at 141.) In effect, Mr. Garza's suit,
timely when filed, was rendered untimely retroactively by Wallace.
The district court further determined that Utah's doctrine of equitable
tolling did not apply because Mr. Garza had "not shown that he was unable to
assert his rights within the limitations period." (Appx. at 142.) The district court
distinguished cases relied upon by Mr. Garza in which courts had applied
equitable tolling to mitigate the effects brought about by Wallace's retrenchment.
The district court cited three considerations. First, none of the cases were based on
Utah law and most relied upon "state equitable tolling laws which are substantially
broader, and hence more lenient, than Utah's." (Appx. at 143.) Second, Utah
already provides "a significantly longer limitations period for § 1983 claims than
those states in which equitable tolling has been found warranted" and applying
equitable tolling "would likely cause substantial prejudice to potential
defendants." (Appx. at 143-44.) Third, "none of the cases granting equitable
tolling . . . involved such an extreme delay as that found here." (Appx. at 144.)
The district court noted that Mr. Garza "waited over nineteen months from the

15132496.4
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time his conviction was overturned before filing the present suit." (Id.) The district
court concluded that Mr. Garza "inexcusably and unreasonably slept on his rights,
making him ineligible for equitable tolling under Utah law." (Appx. at 146
(quotation and alteration omitted).) The district court entered judgment in favor of
Officer Burnett on March 25, 2010. (Appx. at 225.)
Mr. Garza appealed the district court's entry of judgment in favor of Officer
Burnett to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, arguing that
the intervening change in the law brought about by Wallace entitled him to
equitable tolling under Utah law. Mr. Garza also moved to certify the equitable
tolling question to the Utah Supreme Court. On March 8, 2012, the Tenth Circuit
issued its decision in which it agreed with Mr. Garza that Wallace rendered
untimely his previously timely complaint. The court then granted Mr. Garza's
motion to certify the question of Utah equitable tolling law. On April 13, 2012, the
Utah Supreme Court accepted the certified question.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On April 19, 2002, Officer Burnett along with another Ogden City Police
officer, Officer McGuire, performed a "knock and talk" investigation of room 133
at a Motel 6 in Ogden, Utah. (Appx. at 70.) Ms. Rosa Reyes Ambris answered the
door and allowed the officers to enter. (Id.) As they entered, the officers heard the
bathroom door shut and they asked Ms. Ambris who was in the bathroom. (Id.)
Ms. Ambris answered that Mr. Garza, her boyfriend, was inside the bathroom.

15132496.4
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(Id.) Without asking permission and lacking probable cause to search the
bathroom, Officer Burnett walked to the door of the bathroom and pushed it open.
(Id. at 71.) When Officers Burnett and McGuire told Mr. Garza to show his hands,
they saw Mr. Garza was holding a firearm and placed him under arrest. (Id.) When
taken into custody, the officers found that Mr. Garza was in possession of
methamphetamine. (Id.)
Mr. Garza was charged with possession of a firearm by a felon in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and possession of methamphetamine in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 844. (Appx. at 56, 71.) Mr. Garza entered a conditional plea, reserving
his right to appeal the district court's denial of his motion to suppress. (Appx. at
56.) Mr. Garza was sentenced to thirty-seven months imprisonment and three
years supervised release. (Id.)
On February 2, 2005, the Tenth Circuit overturned Mr. Garza's conviction,
holding that the officers' search of the bathroom was unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment. United States v. Garza, No. 04-4046, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS
1659, at *2 (10th Cir. Feb. 2, 2005) (unpublished).2 (See also Appx. at 56-61.) By
the time his conviction was overturned, Mr. Garza had served a total of thirty-one
months in prison. (Appx. at 71.)
Mr. Garza filed his original pro se complaint on October 25, 2006, alleging,
among other things, violation of his Fourth Amendment rights arising out of

2

Copies of all unpublished cases are attached hereto as Exhibit A.
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Officer Burnett's unreasonable search on the date of Mr. Garza's arrest, April 19,
2002. (Appellant's Supp. Appx. at 1-18.) On February 16, 2007, Mr. Garza filed
suit in federal court naming Officer Burnett under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, based on the
unconstitutional search of the hotel bathroom.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Under Utah's principles of equitable tolling, the limitations period is tolled
when a case presents "exceptional circumstances" and the application of the
i

statute of limitations would be irrational or unjust. Here, at the time Mr. Garza
filed his action, it was timely. However, it became untimely solely by reason of
the intervening change in the law brought about by the U.S. Supreme Court's
decision in Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007). This unforeseeable intervening
event gives rise to "exceptional circumstances" under Utah law and makes
application of the four-year limitations period irrational and unjust.
Absent a tolling of the limitations period, Mr. Garza will lose his claims
entirely, claims that were timely when filed. In contrast, tolling the limitations
period will not prejudice Officer Burnett in the least because at the time the claims
were brought, Mr. Garza's claims were timely and Officer Burnett could not have
relied on the passage of time to extinguish them. The balancing test which is the
crux of Utah's principles of equitable tolling favors a finding of exceptional
circumstances sufficient to toll the statute of limitations.
The limitations period that under Wallace had begun to run on the date of

15132496.4
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the unlawful search (April 19,2002) should therefore be equitably tolled until the
date on which Mr. Garza's conviction was overturned (February 2, 2005).
Therefore, Mr. Garza's claims against Officer Burnett were timely.
ARGUMENT
I.

UNDER UTAH LAW, AN INTERVENING CHANGE IN THE LAW
MERITS EQUITABLE TOLLING UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES
OF MR. GARZA'S CASE.
In Utah, "the principle of equitable tolling has been developed almost

exclusively through the application of the discovery rule." Beaver County v.
Property Tax Div., 2006 UT 6, If 30, 128 P.3d 1187 (quotation and alteration
omitted). Utah courts apply the equitable discovery rule when (1) "a plaintiff does
not become aware of the cause of action because of the defendant's concealment
or misleading conduct" or (2) "the case presents exceptional circumstances and the
application of the general rule would be irrational or unjust, regardless of any
showing that the defendant has prevented the discovery of the cause of action."
Berneau v. Martino, 2009 UT 87,123, 223 P.3d 1128 (quotations omitted;
emphasis added). Utah courts have held that before either test can be satisfied,
"the plaintiff must make an initial showing that he did not know nor should have
reasonably known the facts underlying the cause of action in time to reasonably
comply with the limitations period." Id.
In situations where the plaintiff could not make a threshold showing that he
did not know nor should have reasonably known the facts underlying his cause of
15132496.4
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action, the Utah Supreme Court has suggested "equitable tolling" may still be
available. See Estes v. Tobbs. 1999 UT 52, U 7, 979 P.2d 823. In a subsequent
case, the Utah Supreme Court explained that the fact that "[n]o Utah court has
ever found occasion to equitably toll a limitations period when there has not first
been a demonstration that the party seeking the tolling could invoke the discovery
rule due to an excusable delay in discovering the underlying claim before the
limitations period expired" does not mean that "no party may ever qualify for
equitable relief in the absence of such a delay in discovering the claim," but
"illustrate[s] the high bar this court has required those seeking such extraordinary
relief to hurdle." Beaver County, 2006 UT, 6 f 29 (citation omitted). "As is true in
all cases of equitable estoppel," for the doctrine to be invoked, the party seeking
equitable tolling must show that it acted in a reasonable manner. Warren v. Provo
City Corp., 838 P. 2d 1125, 1130 (Utah 1992). Here, Mr. Garza clearly satisfies
this criteria. He "acted in a reasonable manner" by timely filing his complaint
under then-controlling Tenth Circuit precedent. Id
A.

Analogous Case Law Suggests Utah Courts Would Apply the
Doctrine of Equitable Tolling when There Has Been a Change in
the Settled Interpretation of the Law During the Course of the
Litigation.

Although no Utah court has squarely addressed whether an intervening
change in the law amounts to "exceptional circumstances" sufficient to justify the
equitable tolling of a statute of limitations, Utah case law suggests that the present

15132496.4
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facts do constitute such "exceptional circumstances." For example, an analogous
set of circumstances is presented when a party failed to raise an issue before the
trial court and then sought to raise the issue on appeal. Utah courts apply the
"exceptional circumstances" standard to such situations and have found that this
standard is satisfied when there has been an intervening change in the law.
In Utah v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994), the defendant moved to
suppress the evidence (cocaine) on the basis that the officer's stop was a "pretext
stop to conduct a fishing expedition type search," and that the subsequent search
of defendant's car and the seizure of the cocaine violated the defendant's state and
federal constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures. Id at
1130. The district court agreed. IdL The State appealed, arguing, in relevant part,
that the court should abandon the "pretext doctrine." Id. The court of appeals
reversed, holding that the trial court erroneously focused entirely on the officer's
subjective state of mind in determining whether the stop was a pretext stop. Id.
Before the Supreme Court, the State urged the court to reject the pretext
doctrine and the defendant argued the doctrine should be adopted under article I,
sections 14 and 24 of the Utah Constitution. Id. at 1134. The State argued that the
defendant had waived the state constitutional analysis by failing to raise the issue
before the trial court. Id. at 1134 n.2. The court disagreed, stating, "We need not
decide whether defendant's state constitutional arguments were adequately raised
and argued before the trial court because 'exceptional circumstances' justify our

15132496.4
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entertaining them on appeal." Id. (emphasis added).
The court found the existence of "exceptional circumstances" because at
the time of the defendant's suppression hearing, "the pretext doctrine was the
controlling rule of Fourth Amendment law as interpreted by the court of appeals"
and so the defendant "had no reason to argue that the doctrine be adopted under
article I, section 14 until the State challenged the doctrine on appeal." Id. (citations
omitted). Similarly, the "arguments under article I, section 24 did not appear
applicable until the court of appeals ruled that equal protection policies constrain
us to uphold the pretext doctrine." Id. (quotation omitted).3
Subsequent to Lopez, the Utah Supreme Court has stated that "exceptional
circumstances is a concept that is used sparingly, properly reserved for truly
exceptional situations, for cases . .. involving rare procedural anomalies." State v.
Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 11 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (emphasis added). Where such
anomalies exist, the exceptional circumstances doctrine allows the court to reach
an unpreserved issue where the failure to do so would be manifestly unjust. See
State v. Munguia, 2011 UT 5, If 11, 253 P.3d 1082.
Here, as in Lopez, we are presented with a procedural anomaly giving rise
to "exceptional circumstances": a change in the settled interpretation of the law
3

See also State v. Haston, 846 P.2d 1276, 1277 (Utah 1993) (per curiam) (finding
exceptional circumstances allowing the defendant to raise the issue of whether
depraved indifference was a culpable state of mind for attempted second degree
murder even though not raised at trial because in a case decided after the trial, the
Utah Supreme Court held that Utah does not recognize the crime of attempted
depraved indifference homicide).
15132496.4
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during the course of the litigation. Also as in Lopez, "the settled interpretation of
the law favored the defendant" - i.e., the party seeking application of the equitable
doctrine, Mr. Garza. See Hill v. Estate of Alfred 2009 UT 28, If 27, 216 P.3d 929
(discussing unique procedural posture of Lopez); see also State v. McCloud, 2005
UT App 466,ffif14-15, 126 P.3d 775 (vacating criminal conviction because
"exceptional circumstances" exist where a change in the law precluded the statute
of limitations issue from being raised at trial). Therefore, like the defendant in
Lopez, who had no need "to argue for a different interpretation of the law below
because the existing interpretation produced the outcome he desired," Mr. Garza
had no need to file his complaint within four years of his arrest because the
existing interpretation of the law indicated (indeed, required) that he wait until his
conviction was reversed. See Hill 2009 UT 28, Tj 27. And once Wallace was
decided, Mr. Garza could do nothing to correct the situation.
Accordingly, the "exceptional circumstances" doctrine preserves Mr.
Garza's claim because strict application of the statute of limitations in the face of
an intervening change in the settled interpretation of the law would be inequitable.
B.

The Balancing Test Required by Utah's Law of Equitable
Tolling Favors a Finding of Exceptional Circumstances
Sufficient to Justify the Equitable Tolling of the Statute of
Limitations.

Under Utah case law, an intervening change in the law which makes a
timely filing untimely justifies invoking equitable tolling of the statute of

15132496.4
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limitations. Under the balancing test required by Utah law to invoke the doctrine
of equitable tolling, Mr. Garza's hardship far outweighs any burden the tolling of
the statute of limitations would impose on Officer Burnett, and, therefore, the
limitations period applicable to Mr. Garza's claims should be equitably tolled.
Given the unanticipated change in the law effected by Wallace v. Kato,

<

whether equitable tolling should apply in Mr. Garza's case depends on balancing
the equities. That balance should be struck in Mr. Garza's favor. Under Utah law,
i

"[t]he ultimate determination of whether a case presents exceptional circumstances
is a question of law and turns on a balancing test that examines the hardship the
statute of limitations would impose on the plaintiff as compared with any

,

prejudice to the defendant from difficulties of proof caused by the passage of
time." Ottens v. McNeil 2010 UT App 237, f 62, 239 P.3d 308 (quotations and
alterations omitted). Factors which may be relevant to this balancing test include
"whether the defendant's problems caused by the passage of time are greater than
the plaintiff s, whether the defendant performed a technical service that the
plaintiff cannot reasonably have been expected to evaluate, and whether the claim
has aged to the point that witnesses cannot be located, evidence cannot be found,
and the parties cannot remember basic events." Sew v. Security Title Co. of S.
Utah, 902 P.2d 629, 636 (Utah 1995).
Here, the balancing test favors Mr. Garza because the policy against stale
claims is outweighed by the unique circumstances of his hardship. See Myers v.
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McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 87 (Utah 1981). Indeed, Officer Burnett has never
asserted otherwise. (See, e.g., 10th Cir. Supp'l Br. of Appellee at 9-10 (arguing that
Mr. Garza has submitted "no evidence" that Officer Burnett will not suffer any
prejudice, but declining to dispute Mr. Garza's assertion); see also Appx. 14-45,
78-119.) In fact, Officer Burnett will suffer no prejudice as a result of the passage
of time. See Ottens, 2010 UT App 237, % 63. Prior to the Wallace decision, Mr.
Garza's claim was timely and Officer Burnett did and should have anticipated the
potential of a lawsuit until February 2009. See, e.g., Larson v. Snow College, 189
F. Supp. 2d 1286, 1298 (D. Utah 2000) (four-year limitations period applies to
§ 1983 claims brought in Utah). In addition, the claim has not aged to the point
that witnesses cannot be located, evidence cannot be found, or parties cannot
remember basic events. See Sew, 902 P.2d at 636. Indeed, the underlying facts
are undisputed. (See 10th Cir. Supp'l Br. of Appellee at v (Officer Burnett states
expressly that he agrees with all of the relevant facts set forth in Mr. Garza's
Statement of Facts that relate to the events that gave rise to Mr. Garza's § 1983
claim).)
Tolling the limitations period is therefore not inconsistent with the
underlying Utah policy that "statutes of limitations are designed to promote justice
by preventing surprises through the revival of claims that have been allowed to
slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have
disappeared." Myers, 635 P.2d at 86 (quotation omitted). In contrast, applying the
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four-year statute of limitations to Mr. Garza will result in Mr. Garza losing his
cause of action completely.
Because Officer Burnett will suffer no prejudice (and cannot argue
otherwise) and Mr. Garza will suffer significant hardship, the balancing test favors
a finding of exceptional circumstances and the statute of limitations should be
equitably tolled.
II.

OTHER FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS AGREE THAT THE
CHANGE IN THE LAW BROUGHT ABOUT BY WALLACE GIVES
RISE TO EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES JUSTIFYING THE
APPLICATION OF EQUITABLE TOLLING.
While not controlling here, it is at least persuasive that a number of federal

district courts have concluded that a change in the settled interpretation of the law
-such as that brought about by Wallace-gives rise to an exceptional circumstance
justifying the equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. For example, in
Hargroves v. City of New York, 694 F. Supp. 2d 198 (E.D.N.Y. 2010), the
plaintiffs brought claims under § 1983 for illegal stop and detention, false arrest,
malicious prosecution, and violation of plaintiffs' equal protection rights. Id at
202. The events which gave rise to the lawsuit occurred on March 20, 1998;
plaintiffs were convicted on May 23, 2000; and on July 29, 2002, the convictions
were reversed. See id. at 203, 206. In relevant part, the plaintiffs commenced their
lawsuit on April 4, 2003, but under Wallace, the plaintiffs' limitations period
expired in March 2001 because § 1983 claims brought in New York are subject to

15132496.4

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

15

a three-year statute of limitations. Id. at 210.
In New York, like Utah, "[e]quitable tolling is available only in rare and
exceptional circumstances, where the court finds that extraordinary circumstances
prevented a party from timely performing a required act, and that the party acted
with reasonable diligence throughout the period he sought to toll." Id. at 211
(quotations and alterations omitted). The district court in Hargroves concluded that
"the change in law occasioned by Wallace is the type of extraordinary
circumstance that justifies equitable tolling." Id.4 The claims brought by the
plaintiffs in Hargroves, like those of Mr. Garza, were "timely when brought" and
"are now untimely under the holding of Wallace." See Hargroves, 694 F. Supp. 2d
at 212. The district court reasoned that the plaintiffs were diligent in pursuing their
claims and "could not have predicted the still-years-away change in the law." Id.
The court concluded that "[t]his constitutes precisely the sort of extraordinary
circumstances in which equitable tolling should operate to save Plaintiffs5 claims."
Id.; see also Wharton v. County of Nassau, Case No. 07-CV-2137, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 99174, at *10-13 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2010) (unpublished) ("Plaintiffs,
through no fault of their own, relied on then-authoritative Second Circuit

4

See also Kucharski v. Leveille, 526 F. Supp. 2d 768, 771 -75 (E.D. Mich. 2007)
(concluding that plaintiff who brought a § 1983 claim for illegal seizure in
violation of the Fourth Amendment may obtain relief from the statute of
limitations under the doctrine of equitable tolling when "the delay in filing is the
product of an understandable confusion about the legal nature of her claim, that
confusion is created by the courts themselves, and the delay does not result simply
from the plaintiffs lack of diligence" (citations and quotation omitted)).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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precedent to their detriment, and strict application of Wallace would effectively
deprive Plaintiffs of their cause of action."); Kennedy v. City of Villa Hills, Civil
Action No. 07-122-DLB, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17301, at *22 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 6,
2008) (unpublished) ("Holding that Plaintiffs claims herein are now time-barred
post-Wallace by the applicable statutes of limitation would result in Heck
ultimately producing immunity for the Defendants, a scenario the Supreme Court
deemed unacceptable."). This same reasoning should apply here.
In granting Officer Burnett's motion for summary judgment, the federal
district court endeavored to distinguish the cases applying equitable tolling to
mitigate the effects of Wallace's changes to the law. It relied on three
considerations: (1) none of the cases were based on Utah law; (2) Utah already
provides a long limitations period for § 1983 claims; and (3) none of the cases
involved "such an extreme delay as found here." (Appx. at 143-44.) The analysis
is erroneous.
First, the fact that the cases that have addressed the specific question are not
decided under Utah lawr simply begs the question. The question of whether Utah's
principles of equitable tolling apply where there has been an intervening change in
the law is a matter of first impression. Moreover, nothing in the cases referenced
by the district court which are discussed above supports the district court's
conclusion that the laws in the relevant states are "substantially broader, and hence
more lenient, than Utah's." To the contrary, the language used by those courts
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mirrors the language used by Utah courts.
Second, the fact that Utah provides a four-year limitations period - one
year longer than the three year periods at issue in Hargroves and Kucharski hardly affects the exceptional circumstances analysis. And the mere fact that
Utah's statute is four years and not three does not suggest that Utah would be less
likely to apply equitable tolling to these facts.6 Arguably, Utah's allowance of a
5

Compare, e.g., Hargroves, 694 F. Supp. 2d at 211 ("Equitable tolling is available
only in rare and exceptional circumstances, where the court finds that
extraordinary circumstances prevented a party from timely performing a required
act, and that the party acted with reasonable diligence throughout the period he
sought to toll." (quotations and alterations omitted)) and Kucharski, 526 F. Supp.
2d at 772 (citing Ward v. Siano, 730 N.W.2d 1, 2 (Mich. Ct. App. 2006)
("Equitable or judicial tolling ordinarily applies to a specific extraordinary
situation in which it would be unfair to allow a statute of limitations defense to
prevail because of the defendant's bad faith or other particular and unusual
inequities.")) with Beaver County, 2006 UT, 6 ^ 29 (court requires "high bar") and
Warren, 838 P.2d at 1130 (the party seeking to toll the statute of limitations must
show it "acted in a reasonable manner"); see also 51 Am Jur 2d Limitation of
Actions § 174 "(The time requirements in lawsuits between private litigants are
customarily subject to equitable tolling if such tolling is necessary to prevent
unfairness to a diligent plaintiff. However, equitable tolling, which allows a
plaintiff to initiate an action beyond the statute of limitations deadline, is typically
available only if the claimant was prevented in some extraordinary way from
exercising his or her rights, or, in other words, if the relevant facts present
sufficiently rare and exceptional circumstances that would warrant application of
the doctrine." (footnotes omitted)).
Utah's four-year limitations period applicable to federal § 1983 claims is neither
unique nor the most generous. See, e.g., Gee v. Pacheco, 627 F.3d 1178, 1190
(10th Cir. 2010) (four-year limitations period applies to § 1983 claims brought in
Wyoming); Burton v. City of Belle Glade, 178 F.3d 1175, 1188 (11th Cir. 1999)
(plaintiff must bring a § 1983 claim arising in Florida within four years); Bishop v.
Crawford, No. 1:10-CV-156-CEJ, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6225, at *17 (E.D. Mo.
Jan. 24, 2011) (unpublished) ("The State of Missouri's five-year statute of
limitations for general personal injury claims is applicable to causes of action
15132496.4

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
10

relatively generous limitations period suggests it would favor the application of
the doctrine of equitable tolling in circumstances such as these. Officer Burnett
cannot show prejudice here because even under the rule in Wallace, a defendant
could not have felt confident of falling outside the limitations period before April
of 2006, only six months before Mr,. Garza filed suit.
Finally, the district court rather oddly mischaracterizes Mr. Garza's case as
one of "extreme delay." The district court illogically suggests that Mr. Garza was
dilatory in filing his suit and that Mr. Garza failed to offer any explanation for this
delay. (Appx. at 144.) But at the time Mr. Garza filed suit, his claims were timely.
The district court's reasoning assumes Mr. Garza could know that Wallace would
be decided and that it would vastly shorten the time he had to file his claims. In
fact, Mr. Garza did not know and could not have known that Wallace would be
decided and that it would dramatically shorten the time he had to file his claims.
By filing his claims within twenty months of his conviction being overturned well within the four-year limitations period - Mr. Garza was, in fact, diligently
based on § 1983."); Blair v. City of Omaha, No. 8:07CV295, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 19365, at *15 (D. Neb. Mar. 3, 2010) (unpublished) ("In Nebraska, there is
a four-year statute of limitations that applies to suits brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983."); Burns v. Town of Lamoine, 43 F. Supp. 2d 63, 68 (D. Me. 1999) ("The
statute of limitations for Section 1983 cases in Maine is six years.").
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pursuing his claims. See Hargroves, 694 F. Supp. 2d at 212 ("Plaintiffs were
diligent in pursuing their claims (each filing suit within a year after their
convictions were overturned), and could not have predicted the still-years-away
change in the law."). A plaintiff is obligated to file his or her complaint within the
limitations period; there can be no justification for punishing a claimant for filing
at a particular point within that period.
III.

PUBLIC POLICY REASONS FAVOR APPLICATION OF
EQUITABLE TOLLING UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES.
The public policy reasons served by limitations periods favor application of

equitable tolling under the circumstances presented by Mr. Garza's case. "A
statute of limitations requires a lawsuit to be filed within a specified period of time
after a legal right has been violated or the remedy for the wrong committed is
deemed waived." Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 672 (Utah 1985).
"[T]he core purpose of any statute of limitations is to compel exercise of a right
within a reasonable time to avoid stale claims, loss of evidence, and faded
memories." Jensen v. IHC Hospitals, Inc., 944 P.2d 327, 322 (Utah 1997); see also
Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 86 (Utah 1981) ("statutes of limitations are
designed to promote justice by preventing surprises through the revival of claims
that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have
faced, and witnesses have disappeared" (quotation omitted)). Equitably tolling the
statute of limitations under the circumstances presented by Mr. Garza's case is
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I

consistent with this core purpose. Mr. Garza exercised his right within a
reasonable time-filing well within the statute of limitations at the time. Further, as
I

noted above, the underlying facts are undisputed so a loss of evidence or faded
memories is not an issue here.
Equitably tolling the limitations period under these circumstances also is

(

consistent with the principles outlined in the Utah Constitution. Article I, section
11 of the Utah Constitution provides:
'

1

All courts shall be open, and every person, for an
injury done to him in his person, property or
reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law,
which shall be administered without denial or
unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from
prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this
State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which
he is a party.

i

Utah Const, art. I, § 11. This section "establishes that the framers of the
Constitution intended that an individual could not be arbitrarily deprived of
effective remedies designed to protect basic individual rights." Berry, 717 P.2d at
675 (emphasis added). The intervening change in the law brought about by
Wallace that rendered untimely Mr. Garza's previously timely claims is nothing
but arbitrary. Equitably tolling the limitations period under these unique and
anomalous circumstances is, therefore, consistent with Utah's open courts clause.
Cf. Berneau, 2009 UT 87, f 27 n.5 ("[T]here may well be a denial of constitutional
rights pursuant to the open courts clause of Utah Constitution, Article I, section 11
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(

in foreclosing persons from access to the court under these unusual
circumstances." (quotation and alteration 'omitted)).
On the other hand, refusing to equitably toll the limitations period under
these circumstances may raise constitutional concerns. "To be constitutional, a
statute of limitations must allow a reasonable time for the filing of an action after a
cause of action arises." Berry, 717 P.2d at 672 (emphasis added).
"It may be properly conceded that all statutes of
limitation must proceed on the idea that the party has
full opportunity afforded him to try his right in the
courts. A statute could not bar the existing rights of
claimants without affording this opportunity; if it
should do so, it would not be a statute of limitations,
but an unlawful attempt to extinguish rights arbitrarily,
whatever might be the purport of its provisions."
Id (quoting Wilson v. Iseminger, 185 U.S. 55, 62 (1902); emphasis added). While
we are faced with a judicial decision and not a legislatively amended statute of
limitations, the effect is the same: Mr. Garza's previously timely claims were
rendered untimely effective immediately upon issuance of the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision in Wallace. "[T]he law is well settled that statutes affecting
limitations may be amended and shortened without impinging on any
constitutional rights of a party, provided always that a sufficient period of grace is
allowed to enable a plaintiff to maintain his cause of action if he will follow the
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I

new law." Vealey v. Clegg, 579 P.2d 919, 920 (Utah 1978) (emphasis added).7
Here, Mr. Garza was not provided any "period of grace" to enable him to
maintain his cause of action. Instead, his claim-filed within four years of his
conviction being overturned as required by then-controlling circuit precedent-was
rendered untimely immediately and without notice of the impending change.
Refusing to equitably toll the statute of limitations under such circumstances
would be manifestly unjust.
CONCLUSION
For all of the reasons set forth herein, the Court should answer the certified
question in the affirmative and hold that, under Utah law, the intervening change
in controlling law brought about by the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Wallace
v. Kato merits equitably tolling the statute of limitations under the circumstances

7

See also City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., 105 P.3d 1163, 1168n.6
(Ariz. 2005) ("When vested rights of private parties are involved, constitutional
considerations prevent an amended statute of limitations from immediately barring
a claim that would have been timely filed under the previously existing statute.");
Willmar v. Short-Elliott-Hendrickson, Inc., 475 N.W.2d 73, 77 (Minn. 1991)
(because "the City had no opportunity to comply with the 1988 amendment, as it
was approved approximately six months after the City served its summons and
complaint on S H E , . . . the amended statute cannot be applied to the City's
claims"); People ex rel. Dep't of Revenue v. National Liquors Empire, Inc., 510
N.E.2d 495, 497 (111. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1987) ("an amendment shortening the
limitation period will not be applied retroactively so as to terminate an action filed
within the limitation period prior to the effective date of the amendment"). In sum,
"[t]he retrospective application of a shortened limitation period is permissible
provided a party has a reasonable time to avail himself or herself of a remedy
before the statute cuts off his or her right of action." 51 Am Jur 2d Limitation of
Actions §51 (2d ed. 2012).
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presented by Mr. Garza's case.
Dated: June 25, 2012
Respectfully submitted,

Amber M. Mettler
SNELL & WILMER L.L.P.
Michael D. Zimmerman
ZIMMERMAN JONES BOOHER LLC
Attorneys for Gerardo Thomas Garza
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Caution
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff- Appellee, vs. GERARDO THOMAS
GARZA, also known as Jerry Garcia, Defendant - Appellant.
No. 04-4046
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
125 Fed. Appx. 927; 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 1659

February 2,2005, Filed
NOTICE:
[**1] RULES OF THE TENTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS MAY LIMIT CITATION
TO UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS. PLEASE REFER TO
THE RULES OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THIS CIRCUIT.
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: Related proceeding at
Garza v. Burnett, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27524 (D. Utah
Mar. 23, 2010)
PRIOR HISTORY:
(D. Utah). (DC. No.
02-CR-42-01-JTG).
United States v. Garza, 269 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 2003 US
Dist. LEXIS 11095 (D. Utah, 2003)
DISPOSITION:

Reversed.

usually high volume of telephone calls and visitors. The
clerk told the officers that the sole occupant of one room
gave a local address, did not have a reservation, and paid
in cash. The officers knocked on the door of one room
and entered with the occupant's consent. Ultimately, the
officers pushed opened the bathroom door, finding defendant, whom they arrested. Defendant had standing to
challenge the search of the bathroom; although not a
registered guest, as a guest invited by the occupant, he
had a legitimate privacy expectation. The government
sought to uphold denial of the motion on a protective
sweep rationale. However, the instant court noted that a
protective sweep could only be performed incident to an
arrest. Even assuming, the protective sweep doctrine
encompassed other circumstances, no objectively reasonable belief existed that the bathroom contained a person posing a danger to the officers or other.

CASE SUMMARY:
OUTCOME: The district court's decision was reversed.
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Defendant appealed a
decision of the United States District Court for the District of Utah, which denied defendant's motion to suppress.

LexisNexis(R) Headnotes

Criminal Law & Procedure > Pretrial Motions & ProOVERVIEW: Police officers conducted a "knock and
cedures > Suppression of Evidence
talk" investigation at a motel. After inquiring of a desk
Criminal Law & Procedure > Appeals > Standards of
clerk as to whether there were activities leading him to
Review > General Overview
belief drug use or trafficking might be taking place, the
clerk gave officers two room
numbers,
indicating
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125 Fed. Appx. 927, *; 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 1659, **

[HNl] In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress,
the court views the evidence in the light most favorable
to the government.

Civil Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review > De
Novo Review
Criminal Law & Procedure > Appeals > Standards of
Review > Clearly Erroneous Review > Findings of Fact
Criminal Law & Procedure > Appeals > Standards of
Review > Clearly Erroneous Review > Search & Seizure
[HN2] The court of appeals accepts the district court's
factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous; however, the ultimate determination of Fourth Amendment
reasonableness is a question of lawr which the court of
appeals reviews de novo.

Constitutional Law > Bill of Rights > Fundamental
Rights > Search & Seizure > Scope of Protection
Criminal Law & Procedure > Search & Seizure > Expectation of Privacy
[HN3] An overnight guest in a hotel room or in the home
of a friend has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the
premises.

Criminal Law & Procedure > Search & Seizure >
Warrantless Searches > Protective Sweeps
Criminal Law & Procedure > Appeals > Standards of
Review > General Overview
[HN4] The court of appeals may uphold the district
court's ruling on any legal grounds supported by the record, even if the court of appeals' rationale differs from
the district court. The court of appeals may do so when
the defendant has had an opportunity to fully litigate any
contested operative facts necessary to the court of appeals' resolution and the district court has made findings
on any such facts.

Criminal Law & Procedure > Search & Seizure >
Warrantless Searches > Protective Sweeps
Criminal Law & Procedure > Search & Seizure >
Warrantless Searches > Search Incident to Lawful Arrest > Extent & Manner of Search
Criminal Law & Procedure > Search & Seizure >
Warrantless Searches > Search Incident to Lawful Arrest > Proximity of Search to Arrest
[HN5] A protective sweep is a quick and limited search
of premises, incident to an arrest and conducted to protect the safety of police officers or others.

Governments > Courts > Judicial Precedents
[HN6] Just as the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit is not at will to overrule the United States
Supreme Court, the court of appeals also may not overrule a panel of the court of appeals absent an en banc
decision.

Constitutional Law > Bill of Rights > Fundamental
Rights > Search & Seizure > Exigent Circumstances
Constitutional Law > Bill of Rights > Fundamental
Rights > Search & Seizure > Scope of Protection
Criminal Law & Procedure > Search & Seizure >
Warrantless Searches > Protective Sweeps
[HN7] A protective sweep may only be performed incident to an arrest.
COUNSEL: For UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff- Appellee: Michael S. Lee, Office of the United
States Attorney, District of Utah, Salt Lake City, UT.
For GERARDO THOMAS GARZA, aka Jerry Garcia,
Defendant - Appellant: Scott Keith Wilson, Office of the
Federal Public Defender, Salt Lake City, UT.
jnUDGES: Before KELLY, ANDERSON, and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges. TYMKOVICH, J., concurring.
OPINION BY: Paul J. Kelly Jr., Circuit Judge
OPINION
[*928] ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the
case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. This
court generally disfavors the citation of orders
and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions
of 10th Cir.R. 36.3.
Defendant-Appellant Gerardo Thomas Garza entered a conditional plea to possession of a firearm by a
felon, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and possession of methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. § 844, reserving the right to
appeal the district court's denial of his motion to suppress. He was sentenced to 37 [**2] months imprisonment and three years supervised release. Our jurisdiction
arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we reverse.
Background
On April 19, 2002, Officers McGuire and Burnett of
the Ogden City Police department conducted a "knock
and talk" investigation at the Motel 6 in Ogden, Utah.
They contacted the desk clerk and inquired whether there
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were any activities at the motel that would lead the clerk
to believe that drug use or drug trafficking might be taking place. II R. at 8-9. The clerk on duty had previously
been trained by the Weber-Morgan Narcotics Strike
Force to look for excessive foot traffic, a high volume of
phone calls, guests with local addresses, lack of a room
reservation, and [*929] cash payment, as indicative of
drug use and sales. II R. at 7-8. The clerk gave the officers two room numbers, indicating, without specificity as
to which room, that there was an unusually high volume
of telephone calls and visitors. II R. at 10, 29. The clerk
also told the officers that when Rosa Reyes Ambris, l the
sole registered occupant of one of the rooms, checked
into the motel, she provided a local address, did not have
a reservation for the room, and paid [**3] in cash. II R.
at 36-40.
1
Ms. Ambris apparently used the surname
"Reyes" on the date of the incident.
Based on this information, the officers knocked on
the door of Room 133. II R. at 10. When the officers
knocked on the door, a male voice asked who was there,
and the officers announced themselves. II R. at 10-11,
68. After a delay, the police knocked again. Shortly
thereafter, a partially clothed female, later identified as
Ms. Ambris, came to the door. II R. at 11, 68. The officers identified themselves and asked if they might speak
with her. Ms. Ambris responded by asking if it would be
OK for her to first get dressed. II R. at 12.
When she returned to the door, she opened it and
backed in so that the officers might enter. II R. at 13, 57.
The district court found that the officers entered the room
with Ms. Ambris's consent. I R. Doc. 37 at 9. Upon entering, the officers heard the bathroom door slam with
force. II R. at 13-14. However, the bathroom door did
not remain folly closed. II R. at 13-14, 72. When [**4]
asked if anyone else was there, Ms. Ambris stated that
her boyfriend, Mr. Garza, was in the bathroom. II R. at
13-14. The officers asked Mr. Garza to speak with them,
but he refused to respond. II R. at 14.
A few moments later, one of the officers pushed the
bathroom door open, revealing Mr. Garza slumped in the
corner. When asked why they wanted to go in the bathroom, Officer McGuire stated that he was concerned that
Mr. Garza was destroying evidence of drug use or distribution. II R. at 14. When asked the same question,
Agent Burnett stated:

The reason you can assume why he was
hiding runs the gamut. They were all bad.

II R. 75. Once in the bathroom, the officers asked Mr.
Garza to show his hands. When Mr. Garza did so, the
officers could see that he was holding a firearm. II R. at
76. The officers drew their weapons and took cover. Mr.
Garza was arrested shortly thereafter. When taken into
custody, Mr. Garza was in possession of [**5] methamphetamine. II R. at 80. After the arrest, Ms. Ambris
consented to a search of the motel room, during which
the officers found a small amount of marijuana. II R. at
26-27.
The district court denied Mr. Garza's motion to suppress. The parties agreed that the officers' entry into the
motel room was consensual from the time of the entry
until the time the officers entered the bathroom. Though
the district court's order is not entirely clear, the district
court apparently thought that the officers' conduct could
only be justified by a finding of probable cause and exigent circumstances. I R. Doc. 37 at 5. The court then
concluded that because reasonable suspicion existed,
probable cause also existed. IR. Doc. 37 at 5.
[*930] The district court also found exigent circumstances. I R. Doc. 37 at 7-8. The court found that
there was little evidence of criminal activity in this case,
but that when the officers pushed the bathroom door
open "they reasonably believed that their safety was dependent upon knowing who was in the bathroom and
what he was doing." I R. Doc. 37 at 8. In the context of
its exigent circumstances holding, the court also found
that the officers had reasonable suspicion [**6] of evidence destruction, possession of dangerous chemicals,
and a suspect arming himself, thereby implicating the
officers' safety. I R. Doc. 37 at 6-7.
Discussion
[HN1] In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, "we view the evidence in the light most favorable
to the government." United States v. Nichols, 374 F.3d
959, 964 (10th Cir. 2004). [HN2] We accept the district
court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous;
however, the ultimate determination of Fourth Amendment reasonableness is a question of law which we review de novo. Id.
As a threshold matter, Mr. Garza has standing to
challenge the search of the bathroom since [HN3] "an
overnight guest in a hotel room or in the home of a friend
has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the premises."
United States v. Carr, 939 F.2d 1442, 1446 (10th Cir.
1991) (discussing Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 109
L. Ed. 2d 85, 110 S. Ct. 1684 (1990)). Although not a

I didn't think anything specifically. I
thought there was one of many things that
could be happening in there. Arming
himself, barricading himself, destroying
evidence, destroying meth lab chemicals
which if mixed can
be dangerous
. . Hunter
.
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registered guest, Mr. Garza, as a guest invited by Ms.
Ambris, II R. at 44, has a legitimate privacy expectation.
United States v. Conway, 73 F.3d 975, 979 (10th Cir.
1995).
Turning to the merits of the appeal, the [**7] government concedes that "there can be no serious dispute
that the district court erred in holding that the officers'
warrantless entry into the motel bathroom was justified
under the exigent circumstances exception." Aplee. Br. at
8. The government urges us to uphold the denial of the
motion to suppress on a protective sweep rationale relying upon Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 108 L. Ed. 2d
276, 110 S. Ct. 1093 (1990). Aplee. Br. at 11. [HN4] We
may uphold the district court's ruling on any legal
grounds supported by the record, even if our rationale
differs from the district court. United States v. Edwards,
242 F.3d928, 935 (10th Cir. 2001). We may do so when
the defendant has had an opportunity to fully litigate any
contested operative facts necessary to our resolution and
the district court has made findings on any such facts.
United States v. Henderson, 241 F.3d 638, 649 n.l (9th
Cir. 2000) ("All of the evidence is in the record and all
of the relevant facts have been resolved."). It gives us
some pause that the government's concession and alternate theory comes in its answer brief on appeal, thereby
only giving Mr. Garza the opportunity to meet [**8] it
for the first time on appeal. However, Mr. Garza does not
argue that he has been unable to develop facts and meets
the alternate theory on its merits. Nevertheless, the government's reliance on the protective sweep doctrine fails
for two reasons.
Mr. Garza argues that the protective sweep doctrine
cannot be relied upon to render the officers' search lawful
since a protective sweep may only be performed incident
to an arrest. See Buie, 494 U.S. at 327; United States v.
Davis, 290 F3d 1239, 1242 n.4 (10th Cir. 2002); United
States v. Smith, 131 F3d 1392, 1396 (10th Cir. 1997).
The government argues that the statements in Buie and
Davis are dicta, Aplee. Br. at 20-26, and that police may
perform a protective sweep without an arrest. United
States v. Gould, 364 F3d 578, 584 (5th Cir. 2004);
United States [*931] v. Taylor, 248 F3d 506, 513 (6th
Cir. 2001); United States v. Garcia, 997 F.2d 1273, 1282
(9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Patrick, 294 U.S. App.
DC 393, 959 F2d991, 996-97 (DC Cir. 1992).
First, the Supreme Court's statement in Buie that
[HN5] a [**9] "protective sweep" is "a quick and limited search of premises, incident to an arrest and conducted to protect the safety of police officers or others" is
not dicta. 494 U.S. at 327. While the Court could have
relied on facts other than that the police search in that
case was incident to a lawful arrest, the Court clearly
found this fact to be important, if not essential. Buie, 494
U.S. at 330-32. Nevertheless, even if the Court's defini-

tion of a protective sweep as a search performed incident
to an arrest can be construed as dicta, '"this court considers itself bound by Supreme Court dicta almost as firmly
as by the Court's outright holdings, particularly when the
dicta is recent and not enfeebled by later statements.'"
United States v. Nelson, 383 F3d 1227, 1232 (10th Cir.
2004) (quoting Gaylor v. United States, 74F.3d214, 217
(10th Cir. 1996)).
[HN6] Just as we are not at will to overrule the Supreme Court, we also may not overrule a panel of this
court absent an en banc decision. In re Smith, 10 F.3d
723, 724 (10th Cir. 1993). We have twice found that
[HN7] a protective sweep may only be performed incident to [**10] an arrest. In United States v. Smith, this
court applied the Supreme Court's definition of "protective sweep" and upheld the admission of evidence found
incident to the execution of an arrest warrant. 131 F.3d
at 1396. Likewise, in Davis, this court disposed of the
government's argument that police were allowed to perform a protective sweep before any arrest was made by
pointing to the Supreme Court's definition of "protective
sweep." 290 F.3d at 1242 n.4. Because Buie defined a
"protective sweep" as a '"quick and limited search of the
premises, incident to an arrest,1" the court found that the
government's argument that a protective sweep could
take place before an arrest must fail. Id. (quoting Buie,
494 US. at 327) (emphasis in original).
Even assuming that Buie's protective sweep doctrine
encompasses circumstances other than an officer's presence for purposes of making an arrest, no objectively
reasonable belief existed that the bathroom contained a
person posing a danger to either the officers or others. In
general, a protective sweep is a brief search of a premises
during an arrest to ensure officer safety if [**11] the
officers have a reasonable belief of danger. Buie, 494
U.S. at 327. The Fourth Amendment allows a protective
sweep if police have "a reasonable belief based on specific and articulable facts which, taken together with the
rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrants
the officer in believing that the area swept harbors an
individual posing a danger to the officer or others." Id.
(internal quotations and citations omitted). Protective
sweeps are justified by the interest of the officers in assuring themselves that the premises are "not harboring
other persons who are dangerous and who could unexpectedly launch an attack." Id. at 333. Thus, a protective
sweep is "appropriate only where officers reasonably
perceive an immediate danger to their safety." United
States v. Owens, 782 F2d 146, 151 (10th Cir. 1986).
"We should evaluate the circumstances as they would
have appeared to prudent, cautious and trained officers."
United States v. Rhiger, 315 F.3d 1283, 1288 (10th Cir.
2003) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
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The officers' protective sweep of the hotel room, including forcing the bathroom [**12] door open, fails to
comply with these standards. As stated by the government, the specific and articulable facts the officers possessed, after speaking with the front [*932] desk attendant at the motel, were that there were two rooms in
the motel that had questionable occupants, in that (1) the
rooms had been rented by local customers who paid in
cash, (2) there had been a high volume of foot traffic and
telephone calls to andfromone of the rooms, and (3) the
hotel was located in an area with past criminal activity.
The record does not specify which of the two rooms had
a high volume of foot traffic or telephone calls. Aplee.
Br. at 17.

"suspicious, evasive, and arguably threatening," such
that, combined with the other facts known at the time,
the officers had a reasonable belief that Mr. Garza and
Ms. Ambris were involved in criminal activity, namely
distribution of narcotics. Aplee. Br. at 18. Because drug
distribution is "likely to involve the use of weapons," cf.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 28, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct.
1868 (1968) (determining that a robbery is likely to involve weapons), the government argues that the officers
had a reasonable basis to fear for their safety. Aplee. Br.
at 19.

We are not persuaded. As previously discussed, Ms.
Ambris freely consented to the officers' entry, thus exhibiting a willingness to cooperate. Once in the room, the
officers did not smell drugs or hear running water, which
However, the officers had no knowledge of who
might indicate [**15] the possible disposal of narcotics.
occupied either room or if the occupants had histories of
II R. at 33, 83. Because Mr. Garza had no obligation to
firearms violations, drug trafficking, or violent crime. II
R. at 33, 66-67; see United States v. Tisdale, 921 F.2d respond to the officers, the government's argument that
1095, 1097 (10th Cir. 1990) (finding reasonable belief of Mr. Garza's failure to respond created a safety threat sufficient to allow a protective sweep carries little weight.
danger based in part on an officer's knowledge of occuIn short, the government's [*933] theory simply is not
pant's previous firearm violations). Further, the officers
linked to specific evidence that would support it as to
were conducting a warrantless "knock and talk" investithis defendant~the increased foot traffic, the phone calls,
gation. This is unlike Buie where the Court emphasized
the reputation of the neighborhood, the local customer
that the officers had an arrest warrant [**13] allowing
paying for a room in cash, and the male occupant of the
the officers to search anywhere in the house that Buie
might have been found. Buie, 494 US. at 330. Moreover, room shutting the bathroom door (perhaps to use the
facilities) do not add up to a "reasonable belief that the
as opposed to situations where officers perform a protecbathroom "harbored an individual posing a danger to the
tive sweep after an arrest, Ms. Ambris voluntarily conofficer or others." Buie, 494 U.S. at 327.
sented to the officers' entry.
Once in the room, the officers did not notice anything particularly suspicious about Ms. Ambris or the
room, such as evidence of drug use or drug trafficking. II
R. at 29, 33, 82; see United States v. Cavely, 318 K3d
987, 995-96 (10th Cir. 2003) (finding reasonable belief
of hidden danger where the police had previously recovered firearms in the house, the suspect arrested had fuel
used to make methamphetamine on his hands, possessed
large amounts of cash and methamphetamine, and admitted that other people were in the house).
After Ms. Ambris consented to the officers' entry,
the officers heard the bathroom door shut and knew that
the male who had first responded to their knock was in
the bathroom and refused to communicate with them. Ill
R. at 81. While it is true that the district court found that
the officers had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity
and that the person in the bathroom [**14] posed a
safety threat (in the context of a different analysis), there
simply are not specific, articulable facts in this record
that distinguish this from any time a person in a bathroom (one of the most private rooms in a dwelling) declines a consensual encounter with the police.
The government argues that Mr. Garza's refusal to
respond and forceful closure of the bathroom door was

REVERSED.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge

CONCUR BY: TYMKOVICH
CONCUR
TYMKOVICH, J., concurring.
I agree with the majority that the "protective sweep"
conducted by law enforcement officers was not anchored
by reasonable suspicion. I therefore concur.
I write separately to note some reservations about
whether a protective sweep can ever be justified absent
an arrest and the majority's application of [**16] Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 108 L. Ed. 2d 276, 110 S
Ct. 1093 (1990). In Buie, the Supreme Court articulated a
doctrine of the warrantless protective sweep, a "quick
and limited search of premises, incident to an arrest and
conducted to protect the safety of police officers and
others." Id. at 327. The Court justified the sweep "as a
precautionary matter," that could be conducted
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without probable cause or reasonable
suspicion, [to] look in closets and other
spaces immediately adjoining the place of
arrest from which an attack could be immediately launched. Beyond that, however, we hold that there must be articulable
facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, would
warrant a reasonably prudent officer in
believing that the area to be swept harbors
an individual posing a danger to those on
the arrest scene. This is no more and no
less than was required in Terry and Long.

Id. at 334.
Two recent cases in this circuit have cited to Buie.
The first, a 2002 case, involved the illegal, warrantless
search of a home. The panel declined to apply the protective sweep rationale where the [**17] search was
neither incident to an arrest nor supported by reasonable
suspicion. See United States v. Davis, 290 F.3d 1239
(10th Cir. 2002). The second case, in 2004, extended
Buie to situations involving "protective detentions." That
panel held that in addition to a protective sweep the police may conduct a protective detention of individuals as
long as there is a "reasonable and articulable suspicion of
potential danger to the arresting officers." United States
v. Maddox, 388 R3d 1356, 1367 (10th Cir. 2004).
The question then is whether those cases, together
with Buie, lay down a flat, per se rule-banning protective
sweeps by law enforcement in every other context. That
seems doubtful to me. We already know that the Supreme Court has allowed concern over officer safety to
justify limited searches in non-arrest street encounters,
see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct.
1868 (1968), and automobile stops, see Michigan v.
Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 77 L. Ed 2d 1201, 103 S. Ct. 3469.
Buie was a natural extension of the logic of those cases.

Against this legal backdrop, the Fifth Circuit sitting
en banc recently confronted [**18] the very question of
whether a protective sweep accompanied by a reasonable
suspicion of danger must always be incident to an arrest.
The court answered no. In United States v. Gould, 364
F.3d 578, 588 (5th Cir. 2004), the court considered a
situation where officers entered a mobile home with the
permission of an occupant. During the encounter, the
officers developed [*934] safety concerns, and, upon
entering the home's bedroom, found firearms. Id. at 591.
Looking to Buie, the court concluded that the Supreme
Court's holding does not flatly bar protective sweeps
during a lawful consensual encounter -where officers
possess a reasonable suspicion that the home harbors an
individual who poses a threat to their safety. Id. at
584-593. The Gould Court's understanding of Buie
would allow a protective sweep where (1) the police enter a home lawfully, (2) the sweep is supported by reasonable suspicion that the area to be swept harbors a
dangerous individual, (3) the sweep is a cursory inspection for persons, and (4) the sweep is short, lasting no
longer than necessary to dispel the threat. Id. at 587.
Thus, Gould [**19] suggests that a protective
sweep may be constitutional outside the arrest context if
officers, pursuant to a lawful consensual encounter, develop a reasonable suspicion that their safety is endangered by a person hiding nearby. l
1 A few other courts have also resisted a per se
approach to Buie. See, e.g., United States v. Toylor, 248 F.3d 506 (6th Cir. 2001) (allowing protective sweep without an arrest); United States v.
Patrick, 294 U.S. App. D.C. 393, 959 F.2d 991
(D.C. Cir. 1992) (allowing protective sweep after
consensual entry).
This, however, is not such a case. I agree with the
majority that at the time of the sweep the officers here
did not have a reasonable suspicion that the motel room
harbored an individual posing a threat to them. The protective sweep was therefore not supportable.
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OPINION BY: ROSLYNN R. MAUSKOPF
OPINION
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
MAUSKOPF, United States District Judge.

Plaintiff, Joshua Wharton ("Wharton"), joined by his
parents Gail and Jonathan Wharton, bring this civil rights
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and New York State law
against the County of Nassau ("County of Nassau" or
"County"), the Nassau County Police Department, Police
Officers Phillip Kouril and Charles DeCaro, and Lieutenant Michael H. McGovern alleging false arrest, malicious prosecution, municipal liability, violation of equal
protection rights, excessive force, and negligence. Defendants move, and Plaintiffs [*2] cross-move, for
summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. For the following reasons, Defendants' motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED
IN PART, and Plaintiffs' motion is DENIED IN ITS
ENTIRETY.
BACKGROUND1
1 The Court relies upon the facts in the parties'
Rule 56.1 statements that are supported by the
admissible evidence and not controverted by the
record.
This action arises out of the January 20, 2004 arrest
and subsequent prosecution of seventeen-year-old Joshua
Wharton. Wharton was arrested following an altercation
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with Nassau County Police Officers Phillip Kouril and
Charles DeCaro at a local Dunkin' Donuts franchise in
Garden City Park, New York. Those events are summarized briefly as follows:
That evening, plain-clothed officers Kouril and
DeCaro responded to a report of a disturbance at Mineola
High School. In connection with this litigation, Kouril
and DeCaro testified that, immediately prior to arriving
on-scene, they passed a group of several black male
teenagers heading north, away from Mineola High
school and in the direction of the Dunkin' Donuts
wherein Wharton was ultimately arrested.
Upon arriving at Mineola High School, Kouril and
DeCaro [*3] claim that a school official reported that
four to five males had been ejected from the gym for
creating a disturbance. According to the officers, the
school official identified one of the ejected youths as
"Joshua." Based on that information, and believing that
the subject youths were possibly those that they had
driven past earlier, the officers left Mineola High School
and headed north to investigate a possible trespassing.
Approximately one block north, the officers observed
two black teenagers inside the Dunkin' Donuts. They
contend that these youths ? later identified as Brian
McGuad and "JJ" Snowden.— were part of the group they
had seen earlier.
It is not disputed that Kouril and DeCaro were in the
process of questioning McGuad and Snowden about the
Mineola High School incidents when Wharton, who had
been at the Dunkin' Donuts counter, interjected.
According to Wharton, he asked JJ what was going
on, and that the plain-clothes officers who had yet to
identify themselves, told him to "shut up" and demanded
that he produce identification. Wharton admits being
uncooperative and that his response was: "Fuck that, I'm
not talking to you." Wharton then claims that he left the
officers [*4] and proceeded to sit down. According to
Wharton, the officers followed him to his table where —
unprovoked — one of them pushed it aside, placed him in
a headlock, and brought him to the ground. Wharton
claims that one officer repeatedly kneed him in the head
while the other officer held his left wrist in a "wrist
lock," and that while he tried to avoid the officer's blows,
he did not resist arrest. Wharton further maintains that, at
no time prior to the altercation did either Kouril or
DeCaro identify themselves, and that he only realized
they were police officers immediately before he was arrested when he heard the officers' walkie-talkies.
The officers paint a very different picture of the incident. They concede that they did not verbally identify
themselves as law enforcement but state that their badges
were displayed around their necks. The officers claim
that upon questioning McGuad and Snowden, Wharton

interrupted by telling his friends that they did not have to
answer any questions. According to Kouril, Wharton
stated, "[fjuck them. This is my hood and you don't have
to speak to those fiickin' niggers." The officers allege that
they asked Wharton for his identification and that [*5]
he began screaming obscenities, and that customers were
becoming alarmed and beginning to leave the store. The
officers claim that they approached Wharton, and that he
stood up and pushed the table into Kouril, stating "Fuck
you" and "I don't give a shit." In response, the officers
grabbed Wharton and pulled him to the ground. They
testified that Wharton was flailing and resisting arrest,
but that they were eventually able to handcuff him.
Following the arrest, Wharton was brought to the
Third Precinct and placed in a holding cell. At the precinct, Kouril and DeCaro spoke with the Desk Officer,
Lieutenant Michael McGovern, regarding the factual
details of the arrest. Based on the officers' narratives,
McGovern determined that the facts were sufficient to
charge Wharton with disorderly conduct, obstructing
governmental administration in the second degree, and
resisting arrest. 2 In the early morning of January 21,
2004, Wharton was released from custody with a Desk
Appearance Ticket.
2 On June 18, 2004, the Nassau County District Attorney's Office charged Wharton with two
additional counts of disorderly conduct.
Plaintiff was prosecuted in the Nassau County District Court, First District, [*6] County of Nassau, and
between March 3, 2004 and February 23, 2006, Wharton
was required to make at least sixteen court appearances
in his criminal case. A bench trial took place on December 12 and 13, 2005, and in a decision rendered on April
24, 2006, the Honorable Sondra Pardes found Wharton
not guilty on all charges.
On July 21, 2006, Plaintiffs served a Notice of
Claim upon the Nassau County Attorney's Office, and on
May 24, 2007, Plaintiffs initiated this action. Defendants
answered on December 7, 2007. Thereafter, the parties
conducted discovery. Both parties now move for summary judgment.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, interrogatories, admissions, and affidavits demonstrate that there are no genuine issues of
material fact in dispute and that one party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c);
Celotex Corp. v.Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S. Ct.
2548, 91 L. Ed 2d 265 (1986). A genuine issue of material facts exists "if the evidence is such that a reasonable
jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party."
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Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106
S. Ct. 2505, 91L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986).
In determining whether a genuine issue of material
fact exists, [*7] the evidence of the nonmovant "is to be
believed" and the court must draw all "justifiable" or
"reasonable" inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Id. at 255 (citing Adickes v. S.H Kress & Co., 398
U.S. 144, 158-59, 90 S. Ct. 1598, 26 L. Ed. 2d 142
(1970)); Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 195 n.l, 125
S. Ct. 596, 160 L. Ed. 2d 583 (2004). Nevertheless, once
the moving party has shown that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that it is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law, "the nonmoving party must
come forward with 'specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 US. 574. 587, 106 S. Ct. 1348,
89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e))
(emphasis in original). The non-moving party "may not
rely on conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated speculation." Scotto v. Almenas, 143 F.3d 105, 114 (2d Cir.
1998). In other words, the nonmovant must offer "concrete evidence from which a reasonable juror could return a verdict in his favor." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256.
Where "the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof at
trial, summary judgment is warranted if the nonmovant
fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to [its] case." Nebraska v.
Wyoming, 507 U.S. 584, 590, 113 S. Ct. 1689, 123 L. Ed.
2d 317 (1993) [*8] (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, "[a] defendant
moving for summary judgment must prevail if the plaintiff fails to come forward with enough evidence to create
a genuine factual issue to be tried with respect to an element essential to its case." Allen v. Cuomo, 100 F.3d
253, 258 (2d Cir. 1996) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at
247-48).
DISCUSSION
I. Claims Against the Nassau County Police Department
Plaintiffs name the Nassau County Police Department as a defendant in this action. Defendants argue, and
Plaintiffs concede, that the Nassau County Police Department is an administrative arm of the County of Nassau and therefore lacks the capacity to be sued. See
Aguilera v. Cnty. of Nassau, 425 F. Supp. 2d 320, 323
(E.D.N. Y 2006) ("[u]nder New York law, the Nassau
County Police Department is considered an administrative arm of the County, without a legal identity separate
and apart from the municipality and, therefore, without
the capacity to sue or be sued."). Accordingly, Plaintiffs'
claims against the Nassau County Police Department are
dismissed.

II. Statute of Limitations
Defendants argue that under Wallace v. Kato, 549
US. 384, 127 S. Ct. 1091, 166 L. Ed. 2d 973 (2007),
Wharton's [*9] § 1983 false arrest claim is barred by
New York's three-year statute of limitations. See Preston
v. New York, 223 F Supp. 2d452, 467 (S.D.NY. 2002)
(§ 1983 actions brought in New York have a three-year
statute of limitations). In Wallace, the Supreme Court
held "that the statute of limitations upon a § 1983 claim
seeking damages for a false arrest in violation of the
Fourth Amendment, where the arrest is followed by
criminal proceedings, begins to run at the time the
claimant becomes detained pursuant to legal process."
Wallace, 549 US. at 397. This decision constrained the
scope of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 US. 477, 114 S. Ct.
2364, 129 L. Ed. 2d 383 (1994), wherein the Supreme
Court previously held that a § 1983 action does not and
cannot ripen "unless and until the conviction or sentence
is reversed, expunged, invalidated, or impugned." Heck,
512 U.S. at 489. Thus, under Heck, the clock for a false
arrest claim started not upon arrest, but only upon favorable disposition of the underlying charges. Wallace modified what courts had come to refer to as the "Heck bar,"
by clarifying that Heck applies only where the § 198.3
claim could invalidate an existing conviction. Anticipated future convictions, however, do not [*10] bar the
accrual of a false arrest claim, which arises once the victim "becomes held pursuant to such process — when, for
example, he is bound over by a magistrate or arraigned
on charges." Wallace, 549 US. at 389 (emphasis in
original).
Applying the Wallace rationale in this case, Plaintiffs' § 1983 false arrest claim accrued on January 21,
2004 when Wharton was issued a desk appearance ticket
and released from police custody and expired three years
later on January 21, 2007. See Weir v. City of New York,
No. 05 Civ. 9268, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61542, 2008
WL 3363129, at *10 (S.D.NY. Aug. 11, 2008) (plaintiffs
§ 1983 false arrest claim accrued when he was given the
desk appearance ticket and released from the stationhouse). In this case, Plaintiffs did not file this action until
May 24, 2007, over three years and four months later.
Because Wallace applies retroactively, see Mallard v.
Potenza, No. 08-cv-0455,
F.3d
, 376 Fed Appx.
132, 2010 US. App. LEXIS 9683, 2010 WL 1879044, at
*1 (2d Cir. May 12, 2010) (noting that the holding in
Wallace itself indicates its retroactivity), Defendants
contend that Plaintiffs' false arrest claim is time-barred.
Plaintiffs appeal to principles of equity, arguing that if
Defendants' motion for summary judgment were [*11]
granted on statute of limitations grounds, Wharton would
be "unfairly penalized for following the Second Circuit
law as it existed in 2004" and "essentially be put in a
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position where he could never seek the redress that other
similarly situated individuals have pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983." PL Opp. at 6. This Court agrees.
Pre-Wallace, the law in this Circuit required that a §
1983 plaintiff alleging false arrest "pursue [his] criminal
case to an acquittal or an unqualified dismissal, or else
waive his section 1983 claim." Roesch v. Otarola, 980
F.2d 850, 853 (2d Cir. 1992). In Covington v. New York
111 F.3d 117 (2d Cir. 1999), the Second Circuit reiterated that if "success on a § 1983 claim would necessarily
imply the invalidity of a conviction in a pending criminal
prosecution, such a claim does not accrue so long as the
potential for a judgment in the pending criminal prosecution continues to exist." Id at 124. Following this precedent, if Plaintiffs brought a false arrest claim prior to
April 24, 2006, it would have created the "distinct possibility of an inconsistent result" in Wharton's parallel
criminal case. However, following the Wallace decision
issued on February 21, [*12] 2007, Plaintiffs' false arrest claim, which otherwise would have been viable, instantaneously became untimely.
In Eargroves v. City of New York, 694 F. Supp. 2d
198 (E.D.N Y. 2010), this Court was faced with a similar
scenario. In that case, also sounding in false arrest, plaintiffs were arraigned in late March 1998, convicted in
2000, and acquitted in 2002; however, they did not bring
suit until 2003. Although under Wallace, plaintiffs' limitations period expired in March of 2001, this Court held
that equitable tolling should be applied where a change
in law retroactively time-barred a claim that was timely
when filed. Id. at 211. This Court reasoned that the
plaintiffs, having filed their complaint within a year of
obtaining a favorable termination of the criminal charges, exercised reasonable diligence in pursuit of their
claims, and that the "still-years-away change in law,"
which the Plaintiffs could not have predicted, constituted
the type of "extraordinary circumstances" that justify the
application of equitable tolling. Id.
For the same reasons announced in Hargroves,
Plaintiffs in this case are entitled to equitable tolling on
their § 1983 false arrest claim. Plaintiffs, through [*13]
no fault of their own, relied on then-authoritative Second
Circuit precedent to their detriment, and strict application
of Wallace would effectively deprive Plaintiffs of their
cause of action. See Kucharski v. Leveille, 526 F. Supp.
2d 768 (E.D. Mich. 2007) (equitably tolling plaintiffs'
false arrest claim in light of the change in law occasioned
by Wallace). Moreover, Plaintiffs have acted with reasonable diligence to pursue their claims. Plaintiffs filed
suit within thirteen months of obtaining a favorable termination, and while they had approximately ten months
after Wharton's acquittal where the claim would have
been timely even under Wallace, they could no better
predict the upcoming change in law than the Hargroves

plaintiffs. Finally, although Plaintiffs waited approximately three months after the Wallace decision to file
their claim, this short delay is insufficient to diminish the
extraordinary circumstance for which equitable tolling
now applies. Accordingly, this Courtfindsthat Plaintiffs'
§ 1983 false arrest claim is timely.
III. False Arrest
The elements of a false arrest claim under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 are "substantially the same" as the elements of a
false arrest claim [*14] under New York law.3 Posr v.
Doherty, 944 F.2d 91, 96 (2d Cir. 1991). To establish a
claim for false arrest under New York law, a plaintiff
must show that (1) defendant intended to confine plaintiff, (2) plaintiff was conscious of confinement, (3) plaintiff did not consent to confinement, and (4) confinement
was not otherwise privileged. Singer v. Fulton Cnty.
Sheriff, 63 F3d 110, 118 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting
Broughton v. State ofNew York, 37NY2d451, 456, 335
NE.2d310, 373NYS.2d87 (1975)).
3 Plaintiffs' Complaint alleges "false arrest"
and "false imprisonment." These terms are
"largely synonymous because an imprisonment
starts at the moment of arrest." Jenkins v. City of
New York, 478 F.3d 76, 88 n.10 (2d Cir. 2007)
(citing reference omitted). Therefore, the Court's
finding with regard to one equally applies to the
other.
"The existence of probable cause to arrest constitutes justification and is a complete defense to an action
for false arrest, whether that action is brought under state
law or under § 1983." Weyant v. Okst, 101 F3d 845, 852
(2d Cir. 1996) (internal quotations omitted); see also
Decker v. Campus, 981 F. Supp. 851, 856 (S.D.NY.
1996) ("If there existed probable cause at the time of the
[*15] arrest, the arrest is 'privileged,' and the individual
has no constitutional or statutory claim against the officer who made the arrest."). "Probable cause is established when the arresting officer has knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to warrant a
person of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense
has been committed by the person to be arrested." Singer, 63 F.3d at 118-19 (citing reference omitted). In determining whether probable cause existed for Wharton's
arrest, the Court must consider the 'totality of the circumstances" in light of the facts known to Kouril and
DeCaro at the time of the arrest. See Jenkins v. City of
New York, 478 F.3d 76, 90 (2d Cir. 2007) ("[p]robable
cause is, of course, evaluated on the totality of the circumstances"); see also Lowth v. Town of Cheektowaga,
82 F.3d 563, 569 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding officers acted
reasonably considering only those facts that were actually available or could reasonably have been perceived by
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them, at the moment they engaged in the challenged
conduct).

as a matter of law that Kouril and DeCaro held probable
cause to arrest Wharton for disorderly conduct.

Here, Wharton was charged with five offenses arising out of the incident at the Dunkin' Donuts: obstructing
governmental administration, N.Y. Pen. L. § 195.05;
[*16] disorderly conduct, N.Y. Pen. L. § 240.20(1), (3)y
and (7); and resisting arrest, N.Y. Pen. L. § 205.30. Defendants argue that they had probable cause to arrest
Wharton for each of these offenses and seek judgment as
a matter of law. Upon a careful review of the record,
however, and drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiffs" favor, as this Court must, it is evident that substantial disputes of material fact preclude summary disposition of these issues.

Finally, with respect to the resisting arrest charge,
Kouril and DeCaro testified that as they attempted to
handcuff Wharton, he fought back. They state that
Wharton tried to pull away, flailed his arms, shrugged his
shoulders, kicked his feet, and screamed fuck these niggers. However, Wharton insists that he did not fight
back. Additionally, the video footage on this issue is
inconclusive. Thus, the record contains disputed issues of
fact as to whether Wharton resisted arrest. In any event,
to be guilty of the offense of resisting arrest, one must
resist an "authorized arrest." N.Y. Pen. L. §205.30. Since
there are issues of fact as to whether Defendants had
probable cause to arrest Wharton, Defendants' motion for
summary judgment on Plaintiffs' § 1983 false arrest
claim is denied.

With respect to the charge of obstructing governmental administration, Kouril claims that Wharton interfered with their investigation by "intimidating his two
friends and attempting to intimidate us by telling [his
friends] not to talk to us. Telling them fuck them, this is
[my] hood, he doesn't talk to niggers." Kouril Dep. at
109. Similarly, DeCaro states that "[w]e were trying to
conduct an interview of two individuals who at the time
of our interview we believed were unrelated to the individual behind me who started yelling, screaming, you
know, basically instructed them not to talk to us."
DeCaro Dep. at 49. However, Wharton testified that upon seeing two men question his friends, he merely asked
what was going [*17] on. Additionally, Wharton states
that when the officers requested his identification, he
simply walked away. Viewing these facts in the light
most favorable to the non-movant, the Court cannot conclude as a matter of law that the officers had probable
cause to arrest Wharton for obstructing governmental
administration.
Similarly, disputed issues of material fact preclude a
finding that the officers had probable cause to arrest
Wharton for disorderly conduct. According to the officers, Wharton was creating a disturbance at Dunkin' Donuts by screaming, cursing and using obscenities such as
"fuck" and "nigger," and that patrons were becoming
scared and leaving. However, Wharton denies acting this
way or using the word "nigger." He does admit raising
his voice and stating, "Fuck that. I'm not talking to you";
however, the record is far from clear that he did so with
the intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or
alarm or recklessly created such a risk. See N. Y. Pen. L. §
240.20 ("A person is guilty of disorderly conduct when,
with intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or
alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof). Additionally, Wharton denies pushing the table into [*18] Kouril
and neither the Dunkin' Donuts employee witnesses who
testified during Wharton's state court criminal trial nor
the Dunkin' Donuts video footage support the officers'
version of events. Therefore, the Court cannot conclude

IV. Malicious Prosecution
Plaintiffs allege that Wharton was maliciously prosecuted [*19] in violation of his rights under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 and New York State law. The elements of a malicious prosecution under New York law are: "(1) that the
defendant commenced or continued a criminal proceeding against him; (2) that the proceeding was terminated
in the plaintiffs favor; (3) that there was no probable
cause for the proceeding; and (4) that the proceeding was
instituted with malice." Droz v. McCadden, 580 F.3d
106, 109 (2d Cir. 2009) (citing Kinzer v. Jackson, 316
F.3d 139, 143 (2d Cir. 2003)). In order to establish a
malicious prosecution claim under 42 U.S.C § 1983, a
plaintiff must assert, in addition to the elements of a malicious prosecution claim under state law, that there was
"a sufficient post-arraignment liberty restraint to implicate the plaintiffs Fourth Amendment rights." Rohman v.
New York City Transit Auth., 215 F.3d 208, 215 (2d Cir.
2000).
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' § 1983 malicious
prosecution claim must be dismissed because Wharton's
Fourth Amendment right to be free from arbitrary seizures was not implicated. However, conditions of pretrial
release that limit travel or require repeated court appearances can constitute seizures within the meaning [*20]
of the Fourth Amendment and are sufficient deprivations
of freedom to sustain a § 1983 malicious prosecution
claim. See Rohman, 215 F.3d at 216 (finding that repealed court appearances and requirement that Plaintiff
"must render himself at all times amenable to the orders
and processes of the court" demonstrated the requisite
post-arraignment restraint); see also Murphy v. Lynn, 118
F. 3d 938, 946 (2d Cir. 1997). In the instant case, Wharton was required to appear for court on sixteen separate
occasions, including two days of trial. Accordingly,
Plaintiffs
have
demonstrated
a
sufficient
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post-arraignment deprivation of liberty to support their
malicious prosecution claim.
As to the remaining elements of a viable malicious
prosecution claim, namely the absence of probable cause
and malice, the Court, for the reasons discussed above,
finds genuine issues of material fact sufficient to preclude summary judgment.
Specifically, Wharton's behavior and demeanor in
the Dunkin' Donuts prior to his arrest is vigorously disputed. Resolution by a jury of that issue is central to the
question of probable cause. The contested probable cause
issue also informs the malice element, as malice can be
inferred [*21] from the absence of probable cause. Accordingly, a reasonable jury could credit Wharton and
find that each malicious prosecution element - the commencement or continuation of a criminal proceeding, a
favorable termination, the lack of probable cause, malice,
and a post-arraignment liberty restraint - has been satisfied. Defendants" motion for summary judgment on
Plaintiffs' § 1983 and New York State law malicious
prosecution claims is therefore denied.
V. Qualified Immunity
The doctrine of qualified immunity shields government officials from civil liability, but only where their
"conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818,
102 S. Ct. 2727, 73 L. Ed 2d 396 (1982). Specifically,
qualified immunity exists where (1) it was objectively
reasonable for the officer to believe there was probable
cause to make the arrest, or (2) reasonably competent
police officers could disagree as to whether there was
probable cause to arrest. Walczyk v. Rio, 496 F.3d 139,
154(2dCir. 2007).
In favor of qualified immunity. Defendants argue
that Kouril and DeCaro reasonably believed that there
was probable cause to arrest [*22] Wharton based on
the report of a disturbance as well as their observations
and interactions inside the Dunkin' Donuts. As determined above, however, the events leading up to Wharton's arrest present genuine issues of material fact, and
shall remain for jury determination. As such, qualified
immunity as to Kouril and DeCaro cannot be resolved as
a matter of law.
However, this Court concludes that Defendant
McGovern is entitled to qualified immunity because he
reasonably believed that the information he received
from Kouril and DeCaro was sufficient to charge Wharton with the crimes for which he was arrested. The record reflects that McGovern did not directly participate in
Wharton's arrest, and although he drew up the charges
against Wharton, he did so based on the accounts of

Kouril and DeCaro. At that time, McGovern had no reason to disbelieve his fellow officers and he was entitled
to rely on their determination that probable cause existed
to arrest Wharton. See Loria v. Gorman, 306 F.3d 1271
(2d Cir. 2002) (finding that officer was entitled to qualified immunity where he did not witness any unlawful
activity and reasonably relied on his fellow officer's determination that the arrest [*23] was lawful). Accordingly, McGovern is entitled to qualified immunity, and
Plaintiffs' claims against him are dismissed.
VI. Municipal Liability
Plaintiffs claim that the County failed to properly
train its officers in determining the lawfulness of an arrest. To hold a municipality liable under § 1983, the
plaintiff must first prove (a) the existence of a municipal
policy or custom in order to show that the municipality
took some action that caused injury and (b) a causal
connection—an 'affirmative link'-between the policy and
the deprivation of his constitutional rights. Monell v.
Dep't ofSoc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S. Ct. 2018,
56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978); Vippolis v. Village of Haverstraw, 768 F.2d 40, 44 (2d Cir. 1985), cert, denied, 480
US. 916, 107 S. Ct. 1369, 94 L. Ed. 2d 685 (1987).
Although lack of training can provide a basis for
municipal liability, see City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris,
489 U.S. 378, 390 n.10, 109 S. Ct. 1197, 103 L. Ed. 2d
412 (1989), Plaintiffs in this case have not presented any
testimony from supervisory or training officers, training
instruction materials, in-service memoranda, or legal
bulletins sufficient to suggest the existence of the requisite municipal policy, custom or practice. 4 To the contrary, Plaintiffs rely solely on the testimony of Kouril,
[*24] DeCaro and McGovern; however, nothing in their
testimony suggests that the County failed to properly
train its officers. In fact, Kouril, DeCaro and McGovern
all testified that they were trained at the Nassau County
Police Department and that they frequently receive legal
bulletins and are provided with additional training opportunities. Moreover, Plaintiffs offer nothing more than
naked allegations that the training opportunities provided
are substantially deficient or in any other way inadequate.
4 Plaintiffs state that Defendants have "failed
to produce any witnesses with regard to how these officers were trained, any training materials,
in-service memorandums or legal bulletins in response to Plaintiffs demands." However, Plaintiffs failed to raise this objection during discovery, and have not demonstrated by affidavit,
"that, for specified reasons, it cannot present facts
essential to justify [their] opposition." See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(f). As discovery has been closed for
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over a year and a half, Plaintiffs' request to reopen discovery is denied.
Thus, based on a careful examination of the summary judgment record, this Court finds that no reasonable factfinder could conclude that [*25] the County of
Nassau failed to properly train its officers. Plaintiffs'
municipal liability claim is therefore dismissed.5
5 Defendants also request that Plaintiffs' claims
for punitive damages against the County of Nassau be dismissed. Defendants' request is granted.
See City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc, 453
U.S. 247, 259-63, 101 S Ct. 2748, 69 L. Ed 2d
616 (1981) (holding that a municipality is immune from punitive damages under § 1983).
However, to the extent that Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiffs' claims for punitive damages
against the individual defendants, that request is
denied. See New Windsor Volunteer Ambulance
Corps, Inc. v. Meyers, 442 F.3d 101, 122 (2dCir.
2006) ("[although a municipality itself is immune from a claim for punitive damages, that
immunity does not extend to a municipal official
sued in his individual capacity") (omitting internal citations).
VII. Equal Protection Claim
Defendants move for summary judgment on Plaintiffs' equal protection claim. 6 The Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution provides that "no State shall ... deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws." U.S. CONST, amend. XIV, § 1. "To [*26]
state a race-based claim under the Equal Protection
Clause, a plaintiff must allege that a government actor
intentionally discriminated against him on the basis of
his race." Brown v. City ofOneonta, New York, 221 F.3d
329, 337 (2d Cir. 2000). Intentional discrimination can
be demonstrated in several ways.
First, a law or policy is discriminatory
on its face if it expressly classifies persons
on the basis of race or gender. In addition,
a law which is facially neutral violates
equal protection if it is applied in a discriminatory fashion. Lastly, a facially
neutral statute violates equal protection if
it was motivated by discriminatory animus and its application results in a discriminatory effect.

Hoyden v. Cnty. of Nassau, 180 F.3d 42, 48 (2d Cir.
1999) (internal citations omitted).

6 Plaintiffs' Complaint does not expressly state
an equal protection claim. They raise this cause
of action for the first time in their opposition to
Defendants' motion for summary judgment. On
this basis alone, Plaintiffs' equal protection claim
is dismissed. See Casseus v. Verizon N.Y., Inc.,
No. 08-CV-4119, 722 F. Supp. 2d 326, 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 68910, 2010 WL 2736935, at * 14
(E.D.N.Y. July 9, 2010) (citing cases) (a plaintiff
may not raise new claims [*27] in his opposition to a summary judgment motion).
Here, Plaintiffs argue that Wharton was arrested
pursuant to facially neutral statutes because of his race
and age. 7 They claim that the officers' investigation was
motivated solely by unlawful race and age discrimination. However, that allegation is belied by the record,
which reflects that Kouril and DeCaro questioned
McGuad, Snowden and Wharton because they believed
these individuals were the same teenagers they had observed earlier walking away from Mineola High School
at the same time they received the report of a disturbance
at the school, and because they matched the descriptions
of several black teenagers that had been ejected from the
school. In sum, there is no evidence in the record to suggest that Defendants discriminated against Wharton
based on his race or age. See Pyke v. Cuomo, 258 F3d
107, 110 (2d Cir. 2001) (stating that a plaintiff who alleges that a facially neutral law or policy has been applied in an intentionally discriminatory race-based manner is not obligated to show a better treated, similarly
situated group of individuals of a different race in order
to establish a claim of denial of equal protection, but
[*28] must still proffer evidence that defendants were
motivated by discrimination); see also Rivera-Powell v.
New York City Bd. of Elections, 470 F3d 458, 470 (2d
Cir. 2006) (conclusory allegations are insufficient to
establish discrimination). Accordingly, Plaintiffs' equal
protection claim is dismissed.
7
Plaintiffs concede that they have not presented evidence that similarly situated individuals
were treated differently than him. They state,
"[ijndeed, it would be impossible . . . to demonstrate that white high school students were not
arrested and charged for using Constitutionally
First Amendment protected language in retaliation for using language which the police officers
did not like." PI. Opp. at 12.
VIII. Excessive Force
Plaintiffs allege that Kouril and DeCaro used excessive force in effectuating Wharton's arrest. As previously
stated, federal claims arising under § 1983 have a

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Page 8
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99174, *

three-year statute of limitations. A claim for excessive
force accrues when, the use of force occurred. Singleton
v. City of New York, 632 F.2d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 1980). In
this action, Plaintiffs' claim for excessive force arose on
January 20, 2004, the date of Wharton's arrest. However,
Plaintiffs did not [*29] bring suit until May 24, 2007,
over three years later. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' excessive
force claim is dismissed as time-barred.8
8
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' federal
claims are time-barred; however, they do not
specifically address Plaintiffs' excessive force
claim. To the extent that Defendants' do not challenge this claim, the Court finds that a sua sponte
dismissal under § 1983 "based on the statute of
limitations is especially appropriate where, as in
this case, the injuries complained of occurred
more than [three] years before the filing of the
complaint-well outside the applicable three-year
limitations period, there are no applicable tolling
provisions as a matter of law, and plaintiffs have
alleged no facts indicating a continuous or ongoing violation of his constitutional rights." Owens
v. Harris, No. 94 Civ. 5968, 1996 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 9952, 1996 WL 399806, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.
July 16, 1996) (quoting Pino v. Ryan, 49 F.3d 51
(2dCir. 1995)).
IX. State Law Claims
a. False Arrest
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' false arrest claim
under New York State law must be dismissed as
time-barred. Under New York General Municipal Law,
an aggrieved individual is required to submit a notice of
claim within ninety [*30] days after the state law claim
arises and bring suit within one year and ninety-days
"after the happening of the event upon which the claim is
based." NY Gen. L. §§ 50-e(l)(a) and 50-i(l). Here,
Plaintiffs state law false arrest claim accrued on January
21, 2004. 9 However, since Plaintiffs did not file their
notice of claim until July 21, 2006., over two years later,
and did not bring suit until May 24, 2007, over three
years later, Plaintiffs' state law false arrest claim is dismissed as untimely under N Y. Gen. L. §§ 50-e(l)(a) and
50-i(l).,0
9 Unlike federal law, which underwent a great
deal of flux and uncertainty in light of Heck and
Wallace, New York State law false arrest claims
have consistently been deemed to accrue immediately upon the plaintiffs release from confinement. See Hill v. City of New York, No. 05 Civ.
9473, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56454, 2006 WL
2347739, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug., 14, 2006) (reject-

ing plaintiffs assertion that a state law false arrest
claim does not accrue until the criminal matter is
terminated); see also Roche v. Village of Tarrytown, 309 A.D2d 842, 766 NYS.2d 46 (2d
Dep't2003).
10 To the extent that Plaintiff raises an excessive force claim pursuant to New York State law,
that claim must [*31] also be dismissed at
time-barred under NY. Gen. L §§ 50-e(l)(a) and
50-i(l).
b. Malicious Prosecution
With respect to Plaintiffs New York State malicious
prosecution claim, "federal and state courts have applied
the statute of limitations for intentional torts against a
municipality with conflicting results." Lieber v. Village
of Spring Valley, 40 F. Supp. 2d 525, 533 (S.D.N.Y.
1999). This inconsistency arises because the statute of
limitations under NY. C.P.L.R. § 215(3) for a claim of
malicious prosecution is one year while the statute of
limitations under N Y. Gen. L. § 50-i(l) is one year and
ninety-days. " In resolving this discrepancy, many of our
sister courts have concluded that the one year and ninety-day limitations period under NY. Gen. L. § 50-i(l)
applies to lawsuits brought against a municipality and its
employees acting within the scope and duty of their employment. See Niles v. City of Oneida, No.
6:06-CV-1492, 2009 US Dist. LEXIS 24933, 2009 WL
799971, at *5 (N.D.N. Y. Mar. 25, 2009) (citing cases).
After a careful review of the applicable statutes and the
relevant case law on this issue, this Court concludes that
the one year and ninety-day statute of limitations under
NY Gen. L. § 50-i(l) [*32] applies to Plaintiffs state
law malicious prosecution claim brought against the
County of Nassau and its empl oyees. Since Plaintiffs
brought suit within this timeframe, their state law malicious prosecution claim is timely. Accordingly, Defendants' motion for summary judgment as to this claim is
denied.
11 In this action, Plaintiffs state law malicious
prosecution claim would be timely under NY.
Gen. L. § 50-i(l) but untimely under NY.
C.P.L.R. §215(3).
c. Negligence
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants were negligent in
effectuating Wharton's arrest and in prosecuting him.
However, "a plaintiff may not recover under general
negligence principles for a claim that a defendant failed
to exercise the appropriate degree of care in effecting an
arrest or initiating a prosecution." Coakley v. Jaffe, 49 F.
Supp. 2d 615, 629 (S.D.N.Y 1999). Moreover, Plaintiffs
failed to file a notice of claim with the County of Nassau
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or commence this action within the time periods prescribed under N. Y. Gen, L. §§ 50-e and 50-/. See Martin
v. Cnty. of Nassau, 692 F. Supp. 2d 282, 290 (RD.N.Y.
2010) (dismissing state law claims as untimely). Accordingly, Plaintiffs' negligence claim is dismissed.
X. Plaintiffs' [*33] Motion for Summary Judgment
Plaintiffs cross-move for summary judgment on
their false arrest, malicious prosecution, and municipal
liability claims. Plaintiffs also seek summary judgment
dismissing Defendants' qualified immunity defense.
However, as discussed above, numerous disputes of material fact preclude summary judgment. Therefore, Plaintiffs' cross-motion is denied.
CONCLUSION
Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted in part and denied in part, and Plaintiffs' cross-motion
for summary judgment is denied in its entirety. The
Court makes the following rulings:
1. Defendants' motion for summary
judgment as to Plaintiffs' New York State
law false arrest claim, § 1983 and New
York State law excessive force claims,
municipal liability claim, equal protection
claim, and negligence claim is GRANTED;

2. Defendants' motion for summary
judgment as to the Nassau County Police
Department is GRANTED;
3. Defendants' motion for summary
judgment as to Plaintiffs' claims against
McGovern based on qualified immunity is
GRANTED;
4. Defendants' motion for summary
judgment as to Plaintiffs' § 1983 false arrest claim and § 1983 and New York State
law malicious prosecution claims is DENIED;
5. Plaintiffs' [*34] cross-motion for
summary judgment is DENIED in its entirety;
The case is recommitted to the assigned Magistrate
Judge for settlement discussions and remaining pretrial
issues, and if necessary, the preparation of a joint pretrial
order.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: Brooklyn, New York
September 20, 2010
/s/RRM
ROSLYNN R. MAUSKOPF
United States District Judge
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OPINION
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This case is presently before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 2), which motion is ripe
for consideration. For the reasons that follow, Defendants* motion will be DENIED as to Plaintiffs § 1983

This civil action arises from Plaintiff Kenneth Kennedy's arrest for disorderly conduct by Defendant Joseph
Schutzman while Kennedy was at the Villa Hills City
Building on May 18, 2005. While those criminal charges
were pending, Kennedy filed a civil suit against the City
of Villa Hills and Schutzman, in his individual and official capacities, on May 8, 2006, in the Kenton Circuit
Court. * That case was removed to this Court pursuant
[*2] to 28 U.S.C. § 1441, on the basis that Plaintiffs civil
rights claims provided federal question jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1331. See Kennedy v. City of Villa Hills, et
al, Cov. Case No. 06-cv-l 12. Defendants then moved to
dismiss Plaintiffs cause of action as premature, in light
of the pending criminal prosecution. Defendants' motion
was granted by Memorandum Order of October 16,
2006, with Plaintiffs Complaint being dismissed without
prejudice. See Id. (Doc. # 8).
1 That Complaint alleged that Schutzman is the
Zoning Administrator/Building Code Enforcement Officer/Building Inspector for the City of
Villa Hills, as well as its City Police Detective.
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The disorderly conduct charge against Plaintiff was
dismissed by the state district court judge on June 19,
2007, after Defendants refused to certify to the Kentucky
Attorney General the issue of whether a city police detective can be employed as both a police officer and as a
city building inspector. The criminal proceedings having
concluded, Kennedy filed a new complaint on July 6,
2007, again in the Kenton Circuit Court. But for the update in procedural history via newly-added paragraph 13,
the content of this second filing is a [*3] mirror image
of the first. And as was done with the first action, Defendants removed the case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441,
based upon federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331. 2 Defendants once again move to dismiss, this
time arguing that Plaintiffs claims are now time-barred.
2
Both Complaints assert various imprecise
claims under four "Cause of Action" headings.
The first two causes of action allege federal
claims. First Cause of Action - a § 1983 claim
against the City of Villa Hills for failure to
properly train and supervise its police officers
and formulate adequate policies to prevent unlawful harassment, false arrest, and false imprisonment in violation of Plaintiffs civil rights and
his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and Kentucky Constitution. Second Cause of Action - a §
1983 claim against Defendant Schutzman, and
other Unknown Defendants, for conspiring to
harass and intimidate Plaintiff, thereby depriving
him of his constitutional rights by threats of
physical arrest, false imprisonment, force and retaliation.
The last two causes of action assert state-law
claims. Third Cause of Action — claims against
the City [*4] and Schutzman for "falsely and
maliciously prosecuting and imprisoning him and
charging him with a misdemeanor crime and other offenses, which was an intentional infliction of
emotional distress, without proper investigation
and without regard to the truth of the situation
and the facts as known to all defendants," to punish and retaliate against Plaintiff for prior complaints and inquiries he had presented to the City
in conjunction with zoning matters. Fourth Cause
of Action — claims against the City and Schutzman for "libeling and slandering him by giving
and swearing to false testimony" that Plaintiff
was a disorderly person, and thereby abusing
process, again to punish and retaliate against him
for his prior complaints and inquiries.
II. Analysis

A. Prior Dismissal of Kennedy's Claims as Premature
This Court, on motion of Defendants, dismissed
Plaintiffs initial Complaint filed in May of 2006. The
Court concluded that dismissal of Plaintiffs § 1983 constitutional tort claims for monetary damages pending
prosecution of Kennedy on the underlying criminal
charges upon which the federal civil claims were based
was compelled by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114
S Ct. 2364, 129 L. Ed. 2d 383 (1994).
Petitioner in Heck [*5] was convicted of manslaughter. While his direct appeal of his criminal conviction was pending, he filed a civil complaint alleging a §
1983 claim of malicious prosecution based upon the acts
and omissions of the investigator and prosecutors involved in his criminal conviction. The Supreme Court
expressed concern about criminal defendants using civil
rights suits for monetary damages as a means to collaterally attack their criminal judgments. The Court set certain conditions that limit pursuit of § 1983 claims to situations where proof of the civil claim will not impact or
disturb the criminal judgment, or the criminal judgment
has already been reversed or vacated.
We hold that, in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm
caused by actions whose unlawfulness
would render a conviction or sentence invalid, [ ] a § 1983 plaintiff must prove
that the conviction or sentence has been
reversed on direct appeal, expunged by
executive order, declared invalid by a
state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a
federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus, 28 U.S.C § 2254. A claim for
damages [*6] bearing that relationship to
a conviction or sentence that has not been
so invalidated is not cognizable under §
1983. Thus, when a state prisoner seeks
damages in a § 1983 suit, the district
court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would
necessarily imply the invalidity of his
conviction or sentence; if it would, the
complaint must be dismissed unless the
plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been
invalidated. But if the district court determines that the plaintiffs action, even
if successful, will not demonstrate the
invalidity of any outstanding criminal
judgment against the plaintiff, the ac-
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tion should be allowed to proceed,[ ] in
the absence of some other bar to the suit.[
]
Id. at 487 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).3
3
The Court's holding in Heck, that a civil
complaint based on underlying criminal proceedings must be dismissed if a judgment in favor of
the plaintiff would imply the invalidity of his
conviction, is commonly referred to by courts as
"the Heck bar."
The § 1983 filing in Heck is procedurally distinguishable from Kennedy's first § 1983 filing. In Heck the
civil suit was presented post-conviction, with appeal
[*7] pending. Kennedy's initial Complaint here was filed
while the disorderly conduct charges were still pending
against him. Nevertheless, and as Defendants expressly
argued in that earlier dismissal motion, the Sixth Circuit
had adopted the Heck rationale and extended it to the
pre-conviction context in Shamaeizadeh v. Cunigan, 182
F.3d 391 (6th Cir. 1999), wherein the Sixth Circuit concluded that it would not have been possible to rule on
plaintiffs § 1983 claim for illegal search in violation of
the Fourth Amendment without deciding issues common
to, and thereby infringing upon, the pending criminal
action, such as the legality of the searches. Id. at 398. 4
Since applying the Heck bar pre-conviction meant
Shamaeizadeh could not bring his § 1983 claim until the
criminal charges against him concluded (they were ultimately dismissed), the Sixth Circuit held that "the proper
starting point for the running of the statute of limitations
is the date of the dismissal of the criminal charges."
Shamaeizadeh 182 F.3d at 399.
4 In so concluding, the Sixth Circuit looked to
the Third Circuit's reasoning in Smith v. Holtz, 87
F3dl08(3dCir.
1996):
We find that these concerns,
[from Heck] apply [*8] equally
to claims that, if successful, would
necessarily imply the invalidity of
a future conviction on a pending
criminal charge. A claim by a defendant in an ongoing criminal
prosecution which necessarily
challenges the legality of a future
conviction on a pending criminal
charge lies at the intersection of
the federal habeas corpus statute
and the Civil Rights Act of 1871.
If such a claim could proceed
while criminal proceedings are

ongoing, there would be a potential for inconsistent determinations
in the civil and criminal cases and
the criminal defendant would be
able to collaterally attack the
prosecution in a civil suit. In terms
of the conflicts which Heck sought
to avoid, there is no difference
between a conviction which is
outstanding at the/time the civil
rights action is instituted and a
potential conviction on a pending
charge that may be entered at
some point thereafter.

Shamaeizadeh, 182 F3d
Smith,87F.3datll3n.5).

at 397-98 (quoting

In ruling on Kennedy's original complaint removed
here in 2006, this Court determined that, although his §
1983 claims as asserted were not a model of clarity, Defendants persuasively argued that each of those claims
regardless of the [*9] label turned upon the issue of the
legitimacy of Kennedy's arrest for disorderly conduct. 5
The Court determined that "[ajccording to the scope of
the claims as set forth by Plaintiff, the resolution of the
disorderly conduct charge in state court is effectively a
threshold condition for the legitimate survival of Plaintiffs [federal] civil claims based thereon." Kennedy v.
City of Villa Hills, et al., Cov. Case No. 06-cv-l 12 (Doc.
# 8, at p. 4). Therefore, this Court dismissed Plaintiffs
claims without prejudice pursuant to Heck and
Shamaeizadeh, indicating Plaintiff would have the opportunity to refile the alleged constitutional violations
assuming a favorable outcome in his criminal proceedings. 6
5 Plaintiff asserts both federal and state claims,
but this discussion is directed to the federal
claims only. The state law claims are addressed
separately in this opinion.
6 Plaintiff noted his concern about the possibility of a future statute of limitations challenge if
he refiled his claims upon conclusion of the
criminal proceedings. The Court pointed out that,
pursuant to Shamaeizadeh, Plaintiffs federal
causes of action accrue, if at all, only upon termination of those state criminal [* 10] charges in
his favor. His causes of action otherwise do not
exist, and the statute of limitations does not begin
to run, until such time. See Kennedy v. City of
Villa Hills, et al, Cov. Case No. 06-cv-122 (Doc.
# 8, at n.6 & accompanying text).
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While this holding in Shamaeizadeh concerning when the statute of limitations begins to
run was derived in part from an expansion of
Heck, the Supreme Court in Heck expressly noted
that the statute of limitations was not at issue because there is "no cause of action under § 1983
unless and until the conviction or sentence is reversed, expunged, invalidated, or impugned by
the grant of a writ of habeas corpus." Heck, 512
U.S. at 489. Commonly referred to as deferred
accrual, the Court held that "a § 1983 cause of
action for damages attributable to an unconstitutional conviction or sentence does not accrue until the conviction or sentence has been invalidated."/^/.
B. Current Requested Dismissal of Kennedy's
Claims as Untimely
Although Defendants previously asserted Plaintiffs
claims were premature, they now denounce them as untimely based upon the Supreme Court's "reversed
course," in Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 127 S. Ct.
1091, 166 L. Ed 2d 973 (2007), a decision issued [* 11]
after to the prior dismissal of Kennedy's claims. In Wallace, the Supreme Court held that "the accrual date of a §
1983 cause of action is a question of federal law that is
not resolved by reference to state law," id. at 1095, and
"[t]he statute of limitations upon a § 1983 claim seeking
damages for a false arrest 7 in violation of the Fourth
Amendment, where the arrest is followed by criminal
proceedings, begins to run at the time the claimant becomes detained pursuant to legal process," id. at 1100.
1 In Wallace, petitioner was arrested and convicted of murder in January 1994, but the charges
were ultimately dropped in April 2002. Thereafter, petitioner filed claims for both false arrest
and false imprisonment, but the Court analyzed
them together as false imprisonment.
Wallace explains that, in a pre-conviction setting,
the statute of limitations on § 1983 claims begins to run
not necessarily when the underlying criminal proceedings conclude, but could begin at an earlier time depending upon the accrual point of the cause of action for that
type of constitutional tort. Id. at 1095-96. The particular
constitutional tort being sued upon in Wallace, false arrest/imprisonment, could be [*12] brought "as soon as
the allegedly wrongful arrest occurred, subjecting [petitioner] to the harm of involuntary detention," but for a
common law distinction in false imprisonment cases that
the limitations period runs when the alleged false imprisonment ends. Id. at 1095-96.
Defendants' analysis of why Plaintiffs federal
claims are now barred under Wallace is straightforward.

{See Doc. # 2, at p. 9) Because Plaintiffs suit seeks
damages "for alleged conduct that resulted in his arrest
and criminal proceedings being brought against him on
May 18, 2005," they infer Plaintiffs suit is one for
wrongful arrest that, under Wallace and the Sixth Circuit's application of Wallace in Fox v. DeSoto, 489 F.3d
227 (6th Cir. 2007), 8 Plaintiff was required to file suit
within one year of his arrest,9 therefore time-barring his
§ 1983 Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims refiled
on July 6, 2007.
8 In Fox, the Sixth Circuit held that § 1983
claims for false arrest "accrue at the time of the
arrest or, at the latest, when detention without legal process ends." Fox, 489 F.3d at 233.
9 It is well-settled that § 1983§ 1983 claims are
governed by Kentucky's personal injury statute of
limitations. "We conclude [*13] that section
1983 actions in Kentucky are limited by the
one-year statute of limitations found in section
413.140(l)(a)r Collard v. Kentucky Bd of Nursing, 896 F.2d 179, 182 (6th Cir. 1990); see also
Dixon v. Clem, 492 F3d 665, 671 (6th Cir.
2007).
Defendants' argument relies on packaging Plaintiffs
federal claims into a "wrongful arrest" box so that Defendants can claim the time clock began ticking back at
the time of arrest. The reality is that Plaintiffs claims
have been poorly identified and pled. The prior dismissal
order noted that the precise nature of the § 1983 claims
and the amendments those claims stood upon simply
were not clear. Defendants never moved in either case
for a more definite statement of Plaintiffs claims or to
dismiss the claims for failure to adequately state a claim
against them.
In this case, it would be unjust to hold Plaintiffs feet
to the fire of a federal constitutional "wrongful arrest"
claim with its companion running date for filing. The
Court's prior dismissal order noted the "conspicuous absence of any Fourth Amendment claim" in Plaintiffs
Complaint, see Case No. 06-cv-l 12 (Doc. # 8, p. 4), yet
curiously Plaintiff relied upon an exception [*14] to
Heck in the context of Fourth Amendment claims in
fighting that prior dismissal motion. In other words, the
nature and scope of Plaintiffs federal claims is anything
but obvious, "wrongful arrest" or otherwise.
Perhaps Defendants did not protest the inartfully
worded Complaint in their first motion to dismiss because it was not necessary to separate out each specific §
1983 claim in order to consider whether the Heck bar
applied. Whatever the labels on Plaintiffs § 1983 claims,
they all implied the invalidity of the disorderly conduct
arrest and detainment, thus requiring dismissal under
Heck pursuant to the Sixth Circuit's extension of the

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17301, *

Heck bar in the pre-conviction context via Shamaeizadek I0 But with the Supreme Court's clarification in
Wallace that the required dismissal and deferred accrual
occasioned by Heck do not apply in the pre-conviction
setting, identifying in precise terms each constitutional
tort being asserted by a civil rights plaintiff becomes
critical in determining the accrual date for each § 1983
claim.
10 The Sixth Circuit applied Heck's bar to filing § 1983 claims to the pre-conviction setting,
reasoning the criminal defendant's focus should
not be misdirected [*15] to raising potential §
1983 claims within one year of an alleged constitutional violation, but instead focused on mounting a viable defense to the pending criminal
charges. And since, if a conviction did occur, the
claims would have to be dismissed without prejudice under Heck as having not yet accrued, it
made sense to allow criminal defendants to wait
until pending criminal proceedings had concluded
to timely file claims, as was done convicted defendants. Shamaeizadeh, 182 F.3d at 399.
In sum, the Supreme Court has not reversed course
as Defendants suggest; Wallace does not overturn or
alter Heck's holding. Rather, it expounds upon the proper
application of the Heck bar.
[T]he Heck rule for deferred accrual is
called into play only when there exists "a
conviction or sentence that has not been ...
invalidated," that is to say, an "outstanding criminal judgment." It delays what
would otherwise be the accrual date of a
tort action until the setting aside of an extant conviction which success in that tort
action would impugn. We assume that, for
purposes of the present tort action, the
Heck principle would be applied not to the
date of accrual but to the date on which
the statute of limitations [*16] began to
run, that is, the date petitioner became
held pursuant to legal process. Even at
that later time, there was in existence no
criminal conviction that the cause of action would impugn; indeed, there may not
even have been an indictment.
Wallace, 127 S. Ct. at 1098 (emphasis in original).
However, the Court's clarification in Wallace about
Heck's application in pre-conviction settings did effectively reverse the course being charted by the Sixth Circuit in Shamaeizadeh and cases relying upon it. The Supreme Court in Wallace declined to adopt petitioner's

argument that pursuant to Heck, the statute of limitations
for his alleged § 1983 claim should not have accrued
until the day his criminal charges were dismissed. Id at
1097-98. Instead, the Court held that Heck did not create
a blanket rule that all § 1983 claims are not cognizable
until dismissal or resolution of criminal charges, determining the statute of limitations for petitioner's false imprisonment claim began to run when he first appeared
before the Court and was bound over for trial. Id. at
1097.
What petitioner seeks, in other words,
is the adoption of a principle that goes
well beyond Heck; that an action which
would [*17] impugn an anticipated future conviction cannot be brought until
that conviction occurs and is set aside.
The impracticality of such a rule should
be obvious. In an action for false arrest it
would require the plaintiff (and if he
brings suit promptly, the court) to speculate about whether a prosecution will be
brought, whether it will result in conviction, and whether the pending civil action
will impugn that verdict, see Heck, 512
U.S., at 487, n.7, 114 S Ct. 2364 - all
this at a time when it can hardly be known
what evidence the prosecution has in its
possession. And what if the plaintiff (or
the court) guesses wrong, and the anticipated future conviction never occurs, because of acquittal or dismissal? Does that
event (instead of the //ed>required setting
aside of the extant conviction) trigger accrual of the cause of action? Or what if
prosecution never occurs - what will the
trigger be then?
We are not disposed to embrace this
bizarre extension of Heck. If a plaintiff
files a false arrest claim before he has
been convicted (or files any other claim
related to rulings that will likely be made
in a pending or anticipated criminal trial),
it is within the power of the district court,
[*18] and in accord with common practice, to stay the civil action until the
criminal case or the likelihood of a criminal case is ended. See id. [citing Heck,
512 U.S.] at 478-88, n.8,512 US. 477,
114 S. Ct. 2364, 129 L. Ed. 2d 383 (noting
that "abstention may be an appropriate
response to the parallel state-court proceedings"); . . . . If the plaintiff is ultimately convicted, and if the stayed civil
suit would impugn that conviction, Heck
will require dismissal; otherwise, the civil
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action will proceed, absent some other bar
to suit.

Id. at 1098 (internal citations omitted).
The Sixth Circuit has recognized that "[i]n no uncertain terms, however, the Court in Wallace clarified
that the Heck bar has no application in the pre-conviction
context." Fox, 489 F.3d at 234. To the extent the Sixth
Circuit in Shamaeizadeh concluded otherwise, that decision has been abrogated. See Fox, 489 FJd at 233; Edison v. Tenn. Dep't of Children's Servs., 510 FJd 631,
639 (6th Cir. 2007). Wallace now requires that where
"plaintiff files a false arrest claim before he has been
convicted (or files any other claim related to rulings that
will likely be made in a pending or anticipated criminal
trial), it is within the power of the district [*19] court,
and in accord with common practice, to stay the civil
action until the criminal case or the likelihood of a criminal case is ended." Id. at 1098. Thus, Wallace still
stands for the principle that courts should refrain from
considering alleged § 1983 claims where there are pending or potential state criminal proceedings and resolution
of the constitutional tort claims would impugn the integrity of a possible future criminal conviction. The difference, post-Wallace versus pre-Wallace, is that now the
proper procedure is to stay the action rather than dismiss
the claims without prejudice pursuant to Heck, which is
what this Court did in Kennedy's prior action.
In light of the Supreme Court's decision in Wallace,
this Court's previous dismissal of Plaintiffs Complaint
without prejudice pursuant to Heck and Shamaeizadeh
may " now present statute of limitations problems for
Plaintiff that this Court in its prior order stated would not
occur. Yet, there is a critical difference between the case
now before this Court and the decisions of Wallace and
Fox. In Wallace and Fox, the plaintiffs did not file their
civil complaint in the first instance until after their criminal charges had [*20] been dismissed or overturned.
Plaintiff here did file his initial Complaint while his disorderly conduct charge was still pending.
11 While it is undisputed that a one-year statute of limitations applies to each of those claims,
determining when the claim accrued for purposes
of when the limitations period begins depends on
the claim. And, as discussed above, the specific
federal claims and amendments relied upon
therefor could hardly be described as being
clearly stated in Plaintiffs Complaint. Nevertheless, given the July 6, 2007, refiling date, any
claim accruing other than upon dismissal of the
criminal charges would likely be time-barred.

The Court is not inclined to unilaterally punish
Kennedy for circumstances not of his own making. The
Court ordered Kennedy's claims dismissed as premature
based on then binding precedent. Plaintiff relied upon the
Court's directive of when his claims would accrue, and
that reliance was not misplaced. Under these circumstances, application of equitable principles is appropriate
and has been similarly recognized where a party relied to
its detriment upon a court's order. See Carlile v. South
Routt Sch. District RE 3-J, 652 F2d 981, 986 (10th Cir.
1981) [*21] (court's order upon which plaintiff reasonably relied led her to believe she had done everything
required of her to timely commence suit). To hold otherwise would unfairly prejudice the Plaintiff in this case.
12 Although Defendants may perceive they are
being prejudiced by not receiving the benefit of
this Circuit change in pre-conviction processing
of § 1983 claims, they never contemplated Plaintiffs claims would be dismissed with prejudice
when the first suit was filed. The only difference
now is that the claims would have been stayed,
rather than dismissed. The Court does not view it
as a prejudice not to bestow upon Defendants the
windfall of complete dismissal, occasioned solely
by the timing of Plaintiffs suits.
Moreover, the Wallace decision also reveals that the
Supreme Court considered the possibility of a factual
situation similar to that before this Court, noting the potential harm to a plaintiff that could result.
Had petitioner filed suit upon his arrest
and had his suit then been dismissed under Heck, the statute of limitations, absent
tolling, would have run by the time he
obtained reversal of his conviction. If under those circumstances he were not allowed to refile [*22] his suit, Heck
would produce immunity from § 1983 liability, a result surely not intended. Because in the present case petitioner did not
file his suit within the limitations period,
we need not decide, had he done so, how
much time he would have had to refile the
suit once the Heck bar was removed.

Wallace, 127 S.Ct. at 1099 n. 4. Holding that Plaintiffs
claims herein are now time-barred post-Wallace by the
applicable statutes of limitation would result in Heck
ultimately producing immunity for the Defendants, a
scenario the Supreme Court deemed unacceptable.
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At least a few lower courts have also been faced
with similar quagmires. In Kucharski v. Leveille, 526 F,
Supp. 2d 768 (E.D. Mich. 2007) the court highlighted
this note in Wallace as support for its conclusion that
plaintiffs claims should not be time-barred despite being
filed outside the statute of limitations. 13 The Kucharski
court also looked to equitable tolling in saving plaintiffs
claims from a strict application of Wallace. On the other
hand, in Sandles v. U.S. Marshal's Service, No.
04-72426, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94180, 2007 WL
4374080 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 18, 2007) (unpublished decision), the court declined to apply Wallace's footnote 4
exception [*23] because the plaintiff had waited ten
months after his criminal conviction was reversed before
filing his claims. More importantly, these two cases signify Wallace considered the possibility that strict application of its holding might produce § 1983 immunity
when civil claims with associated criminal proceedings
were filed and then dismissed pursuant to Heck, "a result
surely not intended." Wallace, 127 S. Ct. at 1099 n.4.
13
It should be noted that the court in Kucharski allowed the plaintiffs claims even though
they were not filed until after resolution of the
criminal matter. The court held plaintiffs late filing was a result of confusion created by the
courts as to when the statute of limitations began
to run. Id.
The facts of this case are just as compelling to apply
equitable tolling as those in Kucharski. In considering
equitable tolling, the court examines "(1) the petitioner's
lack of notice of the filing requirement; (2) the petitioner's lack of constructive knowledge of the filing requirement; (3) diligence in pursuing one's rights; (4) absence
of prejudice to the respondent; and (5) the petitioner's
reasonableness in remaining ignorant of the legal requirement for filing [*24] his claim." Ajazi v. Gonzales,
216 Fed Appx. 515, 518 (6th Cir. 2007). Plaintiff here
diligently pursued his rights as evidenced by his first
filing. Given the Court's Memorandum Order dismissing
his claims and instructing him to refile upon resolution of
the criminal proceedings, there was no reason for him to
know of any other filing requirement, and there is no true
prejudice to Defendants as previously noted herein. Accordingly, for these and all of the other reasons previously discussed herein, the Court finds that Plaintiffs
second filing is deemed timely and assertion of his federal claims is not otherwise time-barred.
C State-Law Claims
Plaintiffs first suit also asserted a number of
state-law claims. After the federal claims were dismissed
without prejudice, continuing supplemental jurisdiction
over the state-law claims was declined and those claims

rage /

were therefore also dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1367(c)(3),
Plaintiffs second filing includes reassertion of these
state-law claims. Of those claims purportedly asserted by
Kennedy, ,4 Defendants seek dismissal of only the false
arrest/imprisonment and libel/slander claims as being
time-barred. According to Defendants, [*25] Kentucky
has a one-year statute of limitations for both of these
claims, which one-year period has long since expired.
Plaintiff has not responded to Defendants' arguments on
these state-law claims.
14 According to the Complaint, the state-law
claims being asserted appear to be for false arrest/imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, malicious prosecution, retaliation,
defamation (libel and slander), and abuse of process.
A one-year period of limitations applies to claims
for false arrest/imprisonment in Kentucky. K.R.S. §
413.140(l)(a), (c). The cause of action accrues and the
one-year period begins to run when the false imprisonment ends, which the Kentucky courts define as occurring when the defendant becomes held pursuant to legal
process, such as being bound over by a magistrate or
arraigned on charges. See Dunn v. Felty, 226 S. W.3d 68,
72 (Ky. 2007).
In this case, Plaintiff was arrested for disorderly
conduct and taken to the Kenton County Detention Center on May 18, 2005. Applying the holding of Dunn,
Defendants submit the allegedly false imprisonment of
Plaintiff also ended on May 18, 2005, when he was. released on bond from the detention center, yet Plaintiff
[*26] did not refile his lawsuit until over two years later,
on July 6, 2007. ,5 The Court does not agree with Defendants' characterization of when the false imprisonment ended. In Dunn, the defendant was released on bail
the same evening as his arrest, then arraigned the following day. His false imprisonment was deemed to have
ended "when he became held pursuant to legal process,"
meaning the date he was arraigned on the charges, see
Dunn, 226 S. W.3d at 72, not the day prior when he was
released on bail.
15 As previously noted, this second filing was,
however, made less than a month after the June
19, 2007, dismissal date of the criminal charges
filed against him in conjunction with his May 18,
2005, arrest.
It may well be that the applicable period of limitations for Plaintiffs false imprisonment claim expired
prior to Plaintiffs July 6, 2007, second filing of his lawsuit. But with the record lacking evidence of when Plain-
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tiff became held pursuant to legal process, thereby ending his false imprisonment and also starting the time
clock from which the statute of limitations ran, the Court
cannot conclude that Kennedy's false imprisonment
claim is time-barred.
Defendants also seek dismissal [*27] of Plaintiffs
libel and slander claim as untimely. Kentucky law requires such defamation claims be filed within one year of
when the cause of action accrues. See K.R.S. §
413.140(l)(d). Generally "it is the publication of the alleged libelous matter that causes the defamation or injury
thus commencing the running of the one year statute of
limitations provided by KRS 413.140(l)(d)." Caslin v.
Gen. Elec. Co., 608S.W.2d69, 70 (Ky. Ct. App 1980).
Defendants point to the statements offered in conjunction with the May 18, 2005, filing of criminal charges as being the purportedly defamatory statements upon
which Kennedy sues. Plaintiff neither disputes this interpretation of the vague allegations in his Complaint, nor
offers evidence of any other or additional statements as
forming the basis of this claim. Starting the one-year
time clock from this date reveals that Plaintiff had until
May 18, 2006, within which to timely file a claim for
libel and slander.
Plaintiffs first lawsuit was filed in state court on
May 8, 2006, and included a claim for libel and slander.
The claim was asserted in a timely fashion in that prior
action. However, when this Court on October 16, 2006,
dismissed [*28] Plaintiffs federal claims without prejudice as having not yet accrued, see Kennedy v. City of
Villa Hills, Kentucky, et al, Covington Case No. 06-112
(Doc. # 8, at p. 5), it also declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs state-law claims and
dismissed them pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), (see
id. at p. 7). Plaintiff could have refiled his libel and slander claim in the Kenton Circuit Court within 90 days of
that October 16, 2006, Order pursuant to K.R.S. §

413.270, Kentucky's "saving statute." Apparently, he did
not do so and instead waited until the conclusion of the
criminal proceedings and the July 6, 2007, refiling of his
§ 1983 claims to reassert his state-law claims. However,
this July 6, 2007, refiling date for his libel and slander
claim is untimely, and Defendants' request to dismiss this
claim on this basis will be granted.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, IT IS ORDERED
that:
(1) Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 2) is
hereby denied in part and granted in part as follows:
(a) Defendants' request to dismiss
Plaintiffs § 1983 claims is hereby denied;
(b) Defendants' request to dismiss
Plaintiffs state-law claim for false imprisonment [*29] is hereby denied; and,
(c) Defendants' request to dismiss
Plaintiffs state-law claim for libel and
slander is hereby granted.

(2) Defendants shall file their Answer to the remainder of Plaintiffs Complaint within twenty (20) days
from the date of this Order.
This 6TH day of March, 2008.
Signed By:
David L. Sunning
United States District Judge
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CASE SUMMARY:

OVERVIEW: Plaintiff inmate's motion for leave to
commence an action without payment of the required
filing fee was granted. But his claims under 42 U.S.C.S.
§ 1985(3) were dismissed as legally frivolous pursuant to
28 U.S.C.S. § 1915(e)(2)(B) because nothing in the complaint or supplement indicated that inmate was a member
of a protected class or that defendants were motivated by
purposeful discrimination.
OUTCOME: Inmate's motion for leave to commence an
action without payment of the required filing fee was
granted, but his claims under 42 U.S.C.S. § 1985(3) were
dismissed as legally frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C.S. §
1915(e)(2)(B).
LexisNexis(R) Headnotes

Civil Procedure > Pleading & Practice > Pleadings >
Complaints > Filing Fees
Civil Procedure > Pleading & Practice > Pleadings >
Proceedings in Forma Pauperis > Prisoners > General
Overview
[HN1] Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.S. § 1915(b)(1), a prisoner
bringing a civil action in forma pauperis is required to
pay the full amount of the filing fee. If the prisoner has
insufficient funds in his or her prison account to pay the
entire fee, the Court must assess and, when funds exist,
collect an initial partial filing fee of 20 percent of the

greater of (1) the average monthly deposits in the prisoner's account, or (2) the average monthly balance in the
prisoner's account for the prior six-month period. After
payment of the initial partial filing fee, the prisoner is
required to make monthly payments of 20 percent of the
preceding month's income credited to the prisoner's account. § 1915(b)(2). The agency having custody of the
prisoner will forward these monthly payments to the
Clerk of Court each time the amount in the prisoner's
account exceeds $10, until the filing fee is fully paid.

Civil Procedure > Pleading & Practice > Pleadings >
Proceedings in Forma Pauperis > General Overview
Civil Rights Law > Prisoner Rights > Prison Litigation
Reform Act > Claim Dismissals
[HN2] Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.S. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the court
may dismiss a complaint filed in forma pauperis if the
action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief
against a defendant who is immune from such relief. An
action is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in either
law or in fact. An action is malicious when it is undertaken for the purpose of harassing litigants and not for
the purpose of vindicating a cognizable right.

Civil Procedure > Pleading & Practice > Defenses,
Demurrers & Objections > Failures to State Claims
Civil Procedure > Pleading <& Practice > Pleadings >
Complaints > Requirements
[HN3] An action fails to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted if it does not plead enough facts to state a
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claim to relief that is plausible on its face. To determine
whether an action fails to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted, the court must engage in a two-step inquiry. First, the court must identify the allegations in the
complaint that are not entitled to the assumption of truth.
These include legal conclusions and threadbare recitals
of the elements of a cause of action that are supported by
mere conclusory statements. Second, the court must determine whether the complaint states a plausible claim
for relief. This is a context-specific task that requires the
reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and
common sense. The plaintiff is required to plead facts
that show more than the mere possibility of misconduct.
The court must review the factual allegations in the
complaint to determine if they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief. When faced with alternative explanations for the alleged misconduct, the court may exercise
its judgment in determining whether plaintiffs proffered
conclusion is the most plausible or whether it is more
likely that no misconduct occurred.

Civil Procedure > Joinder of Claims & Remedies >
Claims
[HN4] Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a) states: A party asserting a
claim to relief as an original claim, counterclaim,
cross-claim, or third-party claim, may join, either as independent or as alternate claims, as many claims, legal,
equitable, or maritime, as the party has against an opposing party. As such, multiple claims against a single
party are valid.

Civil Procedure > Parties > Joinder > Permissive Joinder
[HNS] Fed R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2) provides: Persons may be
joined in one action as defendants if: (A) any right to
relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the
alternative with respect to or arising out of the same
transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and (B) any question of law or fact common
to all defendants will arise in the action.

Civil Procedure > Pleading & Practice > Pleadings >
Proceedings in Forma Pauperis > Prisoners > Three
Strikes Provision
Civil Procedure > Parties > Joinder > General Overview
[HN6] In litigation involving prisoners, unrelated claims
against different defendants belong in different suits in
part to ensure that prisoners pay the required filing fees
because the Prison Litigation Reform Act limits to 3 the
number of frivolous suits or appeals that any prisoner
may file without prepayment of the required fees.

Civil Procedure > Parties > Joinder > Misjoinder
[HN7] Fed. R. Civ. P. 21 provides: Misjoinder of parties
is not a ground for dismissing an action. On motion, or
on its own, the court may at any time, on just terms, add
or drop a party. The court may also sever any claim
against a party.

Civil Rights Law > Conspiracy > General Overview
Civil Rights Law > Conspiracy > Elements
[HN8] Title 42 U.S.C.S. § 1985 concerns conspiracies to
interfere with civil rights. Section 1985(3) provides in
pertinent part: If two or more persons conspire for the
purposes of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any
person or class of persons of the equal protection of the
laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the
laws, the party so injured or deprived may have an action
for the recovery of damages occasioned by such injury or
deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators.
Thus, to state a claim under § 1985(3), a plaintiff must
establish that: (1) he is a member of a class suffering
from invidious discrimination; and (2) defendants' actions were motivated by racial animus or some other type
of class-based discrimination.

Civil Rights Law > Section 1983 Actions > General
Overview
Governments > Legislation > Statutes of Limitations >
Time Limitations
[HN9] The State of Missouri's five-year statute of limitations for general personal injury claims is applicable to
causes of action based on 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983.

Civil Rights Law > Section 1983 Actions > General
Overview
[HN10] A state is not a "person" under 42 U.S.C.S. §
1983 and a § 1983 suit cannot be brought against state
agency.

Civil Procedure > Pleading & Practice > Pleadings >
Complaints > Requirements
[HN11] Legal conclusions and threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action that are supported by mere
conclusory statements are not entitled to the assumption
of truth.

Civil Procedure > Jurisdiction > Subject Matter Jurisdiction > Supplemental Jurisdiction > Pendent Claims
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[HN12] Where federal claims have been dismissed, district courts may decline jurisdiction over pendent state
claims as a matter of discretion.
COUNSEL: [*1] Charles H. Bishop, Plaintiff, Pro se,
Cameron, MO.
JUDGES: Carol E. Jackson, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
OPINION BY: Carol E. Jackson
OPINION
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court upon the motion of
Charles H. Bishop (Registration No. 505063) for leave to
commence this action without payment of the required
filing fee.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)
[HN1] Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), a prisoner bringing a civil action in forma pauperis is required to
pay the full amount of the filing fee. If the prisoner has
insufficient funds in his or her prison account to pay the
entire fee, the Court must assess and, when funds exist,
collect an initial partial filing fee of 20 percent of the
greater of (1) the average monthly deposits in the prisoner's account, or (2) the average monthly balance in the
prisoner's account for the prior six-month period. After
payment of the initial partial filing fee, the prisoner is
required to make monthly payments of 20 percent of the
preceding month's income credited to the prisoner's account. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The agency having custody of the prisoner will forward these monthly payments to the Clerk of Court each time the amount in the
prisoner's account exceeds $10, until [*2] the filing fee
is fully paid. Id.
Plaintiff has submitted an affidavit and a certified
copy of his prison account statement for the six-month
period immediately preceding the submission of his
complaint. A review of plaintiffs account indicates an
average monthly balance of $.21 and an average monthly
deposit of $94.33. Plaintiff has insufficient funds to pay
the entire filing fee. Accordingly, the Court will assess
an initial partial filing fee of $18.87, which is 20 percent
of plaintiff s average monthly deposit.
28 U.S.C§ 1915(e)
[HN2] Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the
Court may dismiss a complaint filed in forma pauperis if
the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary re-

lief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.
An action is frivolous if "it lacks an arguable basis in
either law or in fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,
328, 109 S Ct. 1827, 104 L. Ed. 2d 338 (1989). An action is malicious when it is undertaken for the purpose of
harassing litigants and not for the purpose of vindicating
a cognizable right. Spencer v. Rhodes, 656 F. Supp. 458,
461-63 (E.D.N.C. 1987), affd 826 F.2d 1061 (4th Cir.
1987). [HN3] An action fails to state [*3] a claim upon
which relief can be granted if it does not plead "enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570,
127 S. Ct 1955, 167 L. Ed 2d 929 (2007). To determine
whether an action fails to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted, the Court must engage in a two-step inquiry. First, the Court must identify the allegations in the
complaint that are not entitled to the assumption of truth.
Ashcroft v. lqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950-51, 173 L. Ed.
2d 868 (2009). These include "legal conclusions" and
"[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action
[that are] supported by mere conclusory statements." Id.
at 1949. Second, the Court must determine whether the
complaint states a plausible claim for relief. Id. at
1950-51. This is a "context-specific task that requires the
reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and
common sense." Id. at 1950. The plaintiff is required to
plead facts that show more than the "mere possibility of
misconduct." Id. The Court must review the factual allegations in the complaint "to determine if they plausibly
suggest an entitlement to relief." Id. at 1951. When faced
with alternative explanations for the alleged [*4] misconduct, the Court may exercise its judgment in determining whether plaintiffs proffered conclusion is the
most plausible or whether it is more likely that no misconduct occurred. Id. at 1950- 52.
The Complaint and Supplement
Plaintiff, an inmate at the Western Missouri Correctional Center, seeks monetary, declaratory, and unspecified injunctive relief in this action brought pursuant to 42
U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 for alleged constitutional violations that occurred while he was incarcerated at the
Southeast Correctional Center ("SECC"). In addition,
plaintiff asserts state-law claims for assault and battery
and negligence. Plaintiff names the following individuals
and entities as defendants: Correctional Medical Services
("CMS"), Missouri Department of Corrections, State of
Missouri, Larry Crawford (Director, Missouri Department of Corrections), George Lombardi (Director, Missouri Department of Corrections), Chuck Dwyer (Superintendent, SECC), Laura Vance (Associate Superintendent, SECC), Michael Cornell (Assistant Superintendent,
SECC), Omer Clark (Associate Superintendent, SECC),
Bill Harris (Director of Recreation, SECC), Johnny Williams (Functional Unit Manager, SECC), Erik Harper
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[*5] (Sergeant, SECC), Alex Clinton (Sergeant, SECC),
Travis Wilhite (Sergeant, SECC), Travis Jackson (Correctional Officer, SECC), Charlana Dunn (Correctional
Officer, SECC), Joshua Lacy (Correctional Officer,
SECC), Aaron Gilliland (Correctional Officer, SECC),
Richard Leavitt (Captain, SECC), Dan Martinez (Lieutenant, SECC), Tracey Mitchem (Classification Caseworker Assistant, SECC), Melisa Dorris (Classification
Caseworker, SECC), Arthur S. Keiper, III (Doctor,
CMS), Elizabeth Conley (Regional Medical Director and
Doctor, CMS), Michael Hakala (Doctor, CMS), Glen
Babich (Medical Directo Doctor, SECC), Marsha Aters
(Registered Nurse, CMS), and John Does #1 - #7.
The complaint consists of numerous claims arising
out of three separate incidents that allegedly occurred
while plaintiff was incarcerated at SECC in 2005. Plaintiff refers to the first event as the "August Attack" and
the second and third events as the "October Attacks."
1. The "August Attack"
Plaintiff has filed as a supplement to the complaint
an affidavit entitled "Affidavit by Charles H. Bishop,
#505063 Regarding Assault by Inmate 8-15-2005" [Doc.
#4]. The affidavit is twenty-three pages long and consists
of 108 numbered paragraphs. [*6] In the affidavit,
plaintiff states that he adheres to the "doctrine of separatism," and as such, during his SECC incarceration, he
"would not cell or live with [a black inmate] under any
circumstances." He alleges that he relayed this information to defendant Charlana Dunn and told her that, if
he was forced to cell with a black inmate, the situation
would constitute an imminent threat to his safety and
security, and he, plaintiff, would be assaulted. Plaintiff
further states that when he realized he was going to be
celled with a black inmate, he told defendant Dunn,
"[P]ut me in a cell with another white boy." Plaintiff
states that, despite his many warnings to defendants
Dunn, Clinton, John Does #1 and #2, Mitchem, Williams, Harper, and "several other unknown C.O.'s," l he
was assigned to a cell with a black inmate. Plaintiff alleges that, on August 15, 2005, in the presence of defendant Travis Jackson, his cellmate attacked him, stabbing him twenty-four times and breaking plaintiffs left
hand.
1 The Court will refer to the "unknown C.O.'s"
as John Does #3 and #4.
Plaintiff states that he was immediately transported
by ambulance to the SECC infirmary, and during this
time, defendants [*7] Jackson and Martinez refused to
remove plaintiffs handcuffs, even after he told them his
left hand might be broken. Plaintiff claims that defendant
Dr. Arthur Keiper examined him at the infirmary and
refused to send him to "an outside emergency medical

trauma center," despite defendant Richard Leavitt's desire to do so, and as a result, plaintiff suffered permanent
injuries. Plaintiff claims that although John Doe #5
overrode Leavitt's authority to send plaintiff to an outside
trauma center, by not insisting that plaintiff nevertheless
be transferred, Leavitt violated his duty to protect him.
Plaintiff states that, on the orders of John Doe #5, he was
sent to "the [SECC] observation cell for approximately
eight hours with no pain medication, waiting to get put
back together."
Plaintiff claims that it was not until the morning following the attack that defendant Dr. Glen Babich began
to suture his wounds. Babich also wrote a referral for
plaintiff to have a chest x-ray, blood tests, and an appointment with an eye doctor. Plaintiff claims that Babich totally ignored his broken left hand. Plaintiff states
that it took "several days and weeks to get these referrals
done," and he was not [*8] seen by defendant Dr. Hakala until September 1, 2005. Dr. Hakala took an x-ray
of plaintiffs hand, but the x-ray was misplaced and another x-ray was taken on September 15, 2005. Plaintiff
was transported to Festus for an MRI on September 28,
2005, and after reviewing the results later that same day,
Dr. Hakala referred him to a hand specialist, Dr. Cameron, who is not a defendant in this action. Plaintiff asserts
that his hand "was never fixed . . . until [he] saw Dr.
Cameron," and that Dr. Hakala's unreasonable delay in
getting plaintiffs x-rays, MRI, and referral to a hand and
joint specialist constitutes malpractice and deliberate
indifference.
As to defendant Elizabeth Conley, plaintiff states
that she is a CMS employee "and has the final say in the
kind of treatment prisoners get." Plaintiff alleges that
Conley was deliberately indifferent to his medical needs
in connection with the August 15, 2005 inmate attack, in
that she "completely disregarded] any other doctors [sic]
request for necessary medical treatment." In addition,
plaintiff states that CMS "refused to provide any necessary, adequate, meaningful, and timely medical care";
however, he also states, "I have been seen [*9] by many
nurses and doctors since the stabbing assault of
8/15/2005 . . . resulting] in no or temporary relief."
Plaintiff complains that the State of Missouri failed
to prosecute the inmate who assaulted him on August 15,
and the Missouri Department of Corrections refused to
accept any responsibility for putting plaintiff in a position of danger.
2. The "October Attacks"
In addition to the "August Attack" affidavit, plaintiff
has attached to the complaint an affidavit entitled "Affidavit Regarding October Attacks by Staff [Doc. #1, pp.
28-42]. The affidavit is fifteen pages long and consists of
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thirty-five numbered paragraphs. Plaintiffs claims relative to the "October Attacks" arise out of two separate
events, one on October 11, 2005, and the other on October 23, 2005. Plaintiff states that on October 11, defendant Alex Clinton, an SECC correctional officer, "violently and physically assault[ed]" plaintiff, repeatedly
slamming his body and face into a cell door which resulted in a broken nose. Plaintiff claims that defendants
Gilliland and Lacy failed to protect himfromthis unnecessary and excessive use of force and failed to notify
defendant Larry Crawford of the attack, as required
[*10] by Missouri law. Plaintiff also claims that defendant Aters refused to provide him necessary medical care
for his injuries.
Plaintiff further states that on October 23, 2005, defendant Charlana Dunn violated his constitutional rights
by insisting that plaintiff place his injured left hand in a
food port so she could handcuff him. Following this incident, plaintiff claims that defendant Dunn continued to
use excessive force and abused him in "the same unnecessary, aggressive, and hostile manner" in retaliation for
filing prison grievances against her. Plaintiff claims that
he reported these incidents to defendants Williams, Harper, and Clinton, but nothing was done. He also claims
that, in retaliation for filing grievances against her, defendant Dunn offered "special treatment and favors" to
other John Doe defendants 2 if they would assault plaintiff.
2 The Court will refer to these "other John Doe
defendants" as John Does #6 and #7.
Discussion

2." George v. Smith, 507 F3d at 607. Moreover, the
Court notes that [HN6] in litigation involving prisoners,
"Unrelated claims against different defendants belong in
different suits, . . . [in part] to ensure that prisoners pay
the required filing fees - for the Prison Litigation Reform
Act limits to 3 the number offrivoloussuits or appeals
that any prisoner may file without prepayment of the
required [* 12] fees." Id.
3 The defendants named in connection with the
August 15, 2005 incident are Johnny Williams,
Erik Harper, Alex Clinton, Travis Jackson, Charlana Dunn, John Does #1 through #5, Richard
Leavitt, Dan Martinez, Tracey Mitchem, Arthur
S. Keiper, Elizabeth Conley, Michael Hakala,
Glen Babich, CMS, Missouri Department of
Corrections, and State of Missouri. Regarding the
October 11, 2005 incident, the named defendants
are Larry Crawford, Alex Clinton, Aaron Gilliland, Joshua Lacy, and Marsha Aters. Defendants
Charlana Dunn, John Does #6 and #7, Johnny
Williams, Erik Harper, and Alex Clinton are
named in relation to the October 23, 2005 incident and Dunn's alleged efforts to enlist others to
assault plaintiff. Plaintiff does not assert any
claims or allegations against defendants George
Lombardi, Chuck Dwyer, Laura Vance, Michael
Cornell, Omer Clark, Bill Harris, Travis Wilhite,
or Melisa Dorris.
At issue in the instant case is whether the thirty-four
named defendants are properly joined in this single action. See id. (district court should question joinder of
defendants and claims in prisoner cases). The Court
holds that they are not.

1. Joinder

Simply stated, plaintiffs allegations relative to
[HN4] Rule 18(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro- [*13] the August 15 incident do not pertain to the same
cedure states, "A party asserting a claim to relief as an
defendants or arise out of the same series of transactions
original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party
and occurrences as those involved in either the October
claim, may join, either as independent or as alternate
11 or the October 23 incident, nor do they involve simiclaims, as many claims, [*11] legal, equitable, or marilar questions of law or fact. Plaintiffs "August Attack"
time, as the party has against an opposing party." As
claims arise out of the physical injuries he sustained and
such, multiple claims against a single party are valid.
the medical treatment he received, or failed to receive,
George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007).
after his cellmate assaulted him on August 15, 2005. The
"October Attacks" claims, on the other hand, arise out of
The instant action, however, presents a case involvtwo
completely different sets of events. The first ining multiple claims against multiple defendants.3 [HN5]
volves an alleged assault by a prison guard on October
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20(a)(2) is controlling 11, resulting in plaintiff breaking his nose. The second
and provides: "Persons . . . may be joined in one action
event arises out of a totally different incident on October
as defendants if: (A) any right to relief is asserted against
23 involving a different prison guard's attempt to intenthem jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect
tionally inflict pain on plaintiff by handcuffing his wrists
to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or
in a food port and enlisting others at SECC to harm
series of transactions or occurrences; and (B) any quesplaintiff in retaliation for filing prison grievances. Thus,
tion of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in
not only do plaintiffs August 15, October 11, and Octothe action." Thus, "Claim A against Defendant 1 should
ber 23 claims pertain to and arise out of wholly unrelated
not be joined with unrelated Claim B against Defendant
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

f

Page 6
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6225,*

events, but his alleged injuries resulting from the various
occurrences are distinctly different. These three occurrences [*14] and the claims arising out of each of them
do not share common questions of law or fact. Each of
plaintiffs claims will require its own review of entirely
separate events asserted against different groups of defendants. For these reasons, the Court concludes that the
thirty-four named defendants are not properly joined
under Rule 20(a)(2).
[HN7] Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
Misjoinder of parties is not a ground
for dismissing an action. On motion, or on
its own, the court may at any time, on just
terms, add or drop a party. The court may
also sever any claim against a party.

Because the claims and defendants cannot be properly
joined in one complaint under Rule 20(a)(2), the Court
will deem the plaintiff as having submitted three separate
lawsuits, each utilizing the same complaint, as follows:
(1) The instant complaint will be construed as asserting claims arising solely
from the August 15 incident. These claims
will be reviewed for frivolity under 28
U.S.C § 1915 (e) in this Memorandum.
(2) A copy of the instant complaint
will be used for the second lawsuit, and
will be construed as asserting claims
against against defendants Larry Crawford, Alex Clinton, Aaron [*15] Gilliland, Joshua Lacy, and Marsha Aters
arising solely from the October 11, 2005
incident. Plaintiff will be required to either pay the full filing fee for the second
lawsuit or submit a motion for leave to
proceed in forma pauperis. If a motion for
leave to file without payment of the filing
fee is submitted, the Court will then review the claims in the second lawsuit for
frivolity under 28 U.S. C. § 1915 (e).
(3) A copy of the instant complaint
will be used for the third lawsuit, and will
be construed as asserting claims against
defendants Charlana Dunn, John Does #6
and #7, Johnny Williams, Erik Harper,
and Alex Clinton arising solely from the
October 23, 2005 incident. Plaintiff will
be required to either pay the full filing fee
for the third lawsuit or submit a motion
for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. If
a motion for leave to file without payment

of the filing fee is submitted, the Court
will then review the claims in the third
lawsuit for frivolity under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e).

Because the same complaint will be used, all three
lawsuits will be considered as having been submitted on
the same date. If the Court were to sever and dismiss the
mis-joined claims and defendants, [*16] the statute of
limitations might preclude plaintiff from re-asserting the
claims based on the October 11 or the October 25 incident in a new complaint.
2. Review of August 15,2005 claims under 28 U.S.C §
1915(e)
Plaintiff alleges that defendants Johnny Williams,
Erik Harper, Alex Clinton, Travis Jackson, Charlana
Dunn, John Does #1 through #5, Richard Leavitt, Dan
Martinez, Tracey Mitchem, Arthur S. Keiper, Elizabeth
Conley, Michael Hakala, Glen Babich, CMS, Missouri
Department of Corrections, and State of Missouri violated his rights under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1983.
a. Section 1985 claims
[HN8] Title 42 U.S.C. § 1985 concerns conspiracies
to interfere with civil rights. Although plaintiff does not
specify under which subsection of § 1985 he is proceeding, the Court will liberally construe the allegations under § 1985(3), which provides in pertinent part:
If two or more persons . . . conspire . . .
for the purposes of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of
persons of the equal protection of the
laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws . . . the party so injured
or deprived may have an action for the
recovery of damages occasioned by such
injury or [*17] deprivation, against any
one or more of the conspirators.

Thus, to state a claim under § 1985(3), a plaintiff must
establish that (1) he is a member of a class suffering from
invidious discrimination; and (2) defendants' actions
were motivated by racial animus or some other type of
class-based discrimination. United Bhd. of Carpenters,
Local 610 v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 834-39, 103 S. Ct.
3352, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1049 (1983); Griffin v. Breckenridge,
403 U.S. 88, 102-03\ 91 S. Ct. 1790, 29 L. Ed. 2d 338
(1971) (plaintiff must allege these two elements to state §
1985(3) claim). In the instant action, nothing in the complaint or supplement indicates that plaintiff is a member
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of a protected class or that defendants were motivated by
purposeful discrimination. As such, plaintiffs § 1985(3)
claims will be dismissed as legally frivolous.
b. Section 1983 claims
[HN9] The State of Missouri's five-year statute of
limitations for general personal injury claims is applicable to causes of action based on § 1983. See Owens v.
Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-50, 109 S. Ct. 573, 102 L. Ed.
2d 594 (1989); Lohman v. Kempker, 34 Fed. Appx. 514,
2002 WL 992330 (8th Cir. 2002) (applying Missouri
five-year statute of limitations to a cause of action under
§ 1983). All of plaintiffs allegations relative to the August 15, 2005 [*18] inmate assault occurred on or prior
to September 28, 2005, when Dr. Hakala referred plaintiff to the hand specialist, Dr. Cameron. Plaintiffs complaint bears a signature date of October 6, 2010. As such,
plaintiffs § 1983 claims against defendants Williams,
Harper, Clinton, Jackson, Dunn, John Does #1 through
#5, Leavitt, Martinez, Mitchem, Keiper, Conley, Hakala,
Babich, CMS, Missouri Department of Corrections, and
State of Missouri arising out of the August 15 occurrence
are barred by the five-year statute of limitations and will
be dismissed as legally frivolous under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B). See Myers v. Vogal, 960 F.2d 750, 751
(8th Cir. 7P92Xdistrict court may properly dismiss in
forma pauperis complaint when it is apparent the statute
of limitations has run).
As additional reasons for dismissing plaintiffs §
1983 claims, the Court notes that the State of Missouri
and the Missouri Department of Corrections are hot suable entities under § 1983. See Will v. Michigan Dept. of
State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 63, 109 S Ct. 2304, 105 L Ed.
2d 45 (1989) ([HN10] state is not a "person" under §
1983)\Alsbrookv. City of Maumelle, 184F.3d999, 1010
(8th Cir. 1999) {§ 1983 suit cannot be brought against
state agency), cert. [*19] dismissed, 529 U.S. 1001, 120
S. Ct. 1265, 146 L. Ed. 2d 215 (2000). To state a claim
against CMS, a plaintiff must allege that there was a
policy, custom, or official action that caused an actionable injury. See Sanders v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 984
F.2d 972, 975-76 (8th Cir. 1993). The instant complaint
and supplement do not contain any such allegations.
Moreover, plaintiffs conclusory allegations that Elizabeth Conley "completely disregard[ed] any other doctors
[sic] request for necessary medical treatment" and that
CMS "refused to provide any necessary, adequate,
meaningful, and timely medical care" do not rise to the
level of a constitutional violation and are legally frivolous, particularly in light of plaintiffs contrary allegations that he was, in fact, treated by CMS physicians
Arthur Keiper and Michael Hakala. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868
(2009)([HN\\] legal conclusions and threadbare recitals

of the elements of a cause of action that are supported by
mere conclusory statements are not entitled to the assumption of truth).
For the above-stated reasons and, having carefully
reviewed plaintiffs allegations relative to the August 15,
2005 occurrence, the Court concludes that this action
should be dismissed [*20] pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B).
Because plaintiffs federal claims will be dismissed,
all remaining pendent state claims will be dismissed, as
well. See 28 U.S.C § 1367(c)(3); United Mine Workers
v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726, 86 S. Ct. 1130, 16 L. Ed. 2d
218 (1966) (if federal claims are dismissed before trial,
remaining state claims should also be dismissed); Hassett
v. Lemay Bank & Trust Co., 851 F.2d 1127, 1130 (8th
Cir. 1988) ([HN12] where federal claims have been dismissed, district courts may decline jurisdiction over
pendent state claims as a "matter of discretion").
Last, the Court will dismiss without prejudice defendants George Lombardi, Chuck Dwyer, Laura Vance,
Michael Cornell, Omer Clark, Bill Harris, Travis
Wilhite, and Melisa Dorris, because plaintiff has failed to
assert any allegations against them. See Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1338 (8th Cir. 1985) (claim not
cognizable under § 1983 where plaintiff fails to allege
defendant was personally involved in or directly responsible for incidents that injured plaintiff); Boyd v. Knox,
47 F.3d 966, 968 (8th Cir. /995;(respondeat superior
theory inapplicable in § 1983 suits).
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs motion
to proceed in forma pauperis [*21] [Doc. #2] is
GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff shall
pay an initial filing fee of $18.87 within thirty (30) days
of the date of this Order. Plaintiff is instructed to make
his remittance payable to "Clerk, United States District
Court," and to include upon it: (1) his name; (2) his
prison registration number; (3) the case number; and (4)
that the remittance is for an original proceeding.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants
George Lombardi, Chuck Dwyer, Laura Vance, Michael
Cornell, Omer Clark, Bill Harris, Travis Wilhite, and
Melisa Dorris are DISMISSED without prejudice, because plaintiff has failed to assert any claims or allegations against them. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs
claims against defendants Larry Crawford, Alex Clinton,
Aaron Gilliland, Joshua Lacy, and Marsha Aters, arising
from the October 11,2005 incident, are SEVERED from
the instant action, because they are not properly joined
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under Rule 20(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Clerk of Court is instructed shall open a new
case, utilizing the complaint [Doc. #1] submitted here.
The new case will be styled Charles H. Bishop v. Larry
Crawford, Alex Clinton, [*22] Aaron Gilliland, Joshua
Lacy, and Marsha Aters, and will bear a Southeastern
Division number.

Doe #7, Johnny Williams, Erik Harper, and Alex Clinton
and will bear a Southeastern Division number.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, as to plaintiffs
remaining claims against defendants Johnny Williams,
Erik Harper, Alex Clinton, Travis Jackson, Charlana
Dunn, John Does #1 through #5, Richard Leavitt, Dan
Martinez, Tracey Mitchem, Arthur S. Keiper, Elizabeth
Conley, Michael Hakala, Glen Babich, CMS, Missouri
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs
Department of Corrections, and the State of Missouri,
claims against defendants Charlana Dunn, John Does #6
arising from the August 15, 2005 incident, the Clerk
and #7, Johnny Williams, Erik Harper, and Alex Clinton,
shall not issue process or cause process to issue, because
arising from the October 23, 2005 incident, are SEVthe [*23] allegations are legally frivolous and fail to
ERED from the instant action, because they are not
state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See 28
properly joined in this action under Rule 20(a)(2) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Clerk of Court is U.S.C§ 1915(e)(2)(B).
instructed shall open a new case, utilizing the complaint
Dated this 24th day of January, 2011
[Doc. #1] submitted here. The new case will be styled
Charles H. Bishop v. Charlana Dunn, John Doe #6, John
/s/ Carol E. Jackson
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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OPINION
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the court on Defendants Patricia Osier, Jeffrey Morgan, Lawrence Reynard, Morgan
Larson, James Skinner, Donald Carey, City of Omaha,
Randy Anderson, Kevin Housh, Donald Truckenbrod,
Michael Scott, and Jason Christensen's (collectively
"City Defendants") Motion for Summary Judgment. l
(Filing No. 235.) As set forth below, the City Defendants' Motion is granted in part and denied in part.
1 Also pending before the court is Defendant
Lori Anzaldo's Motion for Summary Judgment
(filing no. 267) and Plaintiffs Objection to
Anzaldo's Motion to Extend Deadlines (filing no.
266). For clarity, the court will address these Motions in a separate Memorandum and Order.
I. BACKGROUND

15, 2009, to respond to the City Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment. (Id)
On December 15, 2009, Blair filed a Brief in Opposition to the City Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment along with an Index of Evidence in Support.
(Filing Nos. 258 and 260.) The City Defendants replied
with an additional Brief in Support of their Motion for
Summary Judgment. (Filing No. 269.)
The party seeking the entry of summary judgment in
its favor must set forth "a separate statement of material
facts as to which the moving party contends there is no
genuine issue to be tried and that entitle the moving party
to judgment as a matter
[*5] of law." NECivR
56.1(a)(1). If the non-moving party opposes the motion,
that party must "include in its [opposing] brief a concise
response to the moving party's statement of material
facts." NECivR 56.1(b)(1). Such response must "address
each numbered paragraph in the movant's statement" of
facts and must contain pinpoint citations to evidence
supporting the opposition. Id. "Properly referenced material facts in the movant's statement will be deemed admitted unless controverted by the opposing party's response." Id; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) ("A supporting or opposing affidavit must be made on personal
knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant is competent to testify
on the matters stated.").
The City Defendants have submitted a statement of
material facts in accordance with the court's Local Rules.
Blair has submitted a Brief and an Index of Evidence in
response. This matter is therefore deemed fully submitted and the court adopts the following relevant undisputed facts.
//. RELEVANT UNDISPUTED FACTS

Plaintiff Steven R. Blair ("Blair") filed his original
Complaint in this matter on August 3, 2007. (Filing No.
1.) After several lengthy extensions of time, Blair filed
an Amended Complaint and the court permitted this
matter to proceed to service. (Filing Nos. 15, 16 and 17.)
In his Amended Complaint, Blair named 27 Defendants:
the City of Omaha, Nebraska; Douglas County, Nebraska; [*4] and 25 individuals. (Filing No. 16.)
Since service of process, the court has resolved numerous motions and dismissed Blair's claims against 14
of the 27 Defendants. (Filing Nos. 110, 167, 169, and
249.) On October 26, 2009, the court issued a Memorandum and Order that addressed 24 pending Motions.
(Filing No. 249.) In that Order, the court limited discovery in this matter to the issue of qualified immunity only
and resolved all of the pending Motions except for the
City Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. (Filing
No. 235.) The court also granted Blair until December

A. Parties
1. Blair is a resident of Omaha, Nebraska. (See
Docket Sheet.)
2. Defendants Randy Anderson (also known as
Randy Szemplenski)
[*6] ("Szemplenski"), Kevin
Housh ("Housh"), Donald Truckenbrod ("Truckenbrod"),
Michael Scott ("Scott"), Jason Christensen ("Christensen"), Lawrence Reynard ("Reynard") and Morgan Larson ("Larson") are all police officers employed by the
City of Omaha. (Filing No. 16; Filing No. 236-2, Attach.
1 at CM/ECF p. 1; Filing No. 236-3, Attach. 2 at
CM/ECF p. 1; 236-4, Attach. 3 at CM/ECF p. 1; Filing
No. 236-5, Attach. 4 at CM/ECF p. 1; Filing No. 236-6,
Attach. 5 at CM/ECF p. 1.)
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3. Jeffrey Morgan ("Morgan") was employed as a
police officer with the City of Omaha from 1985 through
2008. (Filing No. 236-7, Attach. 6 at CM/ECF p. 1.)

(Filing No. 236-2, Attach. 1; Filing No. 236-4, Attach. 3; Filing No. 236-6, Attach. 5; Filing No. 236-5,
Attach. 4.)

4. Patricia Osier ("Osier") was employed as a Senior
Crime Lab Technician with the City of Omaha in 1997.
Osier retired in September 2007. (Filing No 236-8,, Attach. 7 at CM/ECF p. 1.)

14. During Blair's trial, several witnesses testified
including officers Housh, Szemplenski and Christensen.

5. James N. Skinner ("Skinner") was employed as
Chief of the Omaha Police Department ("OPD") from
November 9, 1989, through August 20, 1997. (Filing No.
238-2, Attach. 1 at CM/ECF p. 1.)

15. Housh testified that the alleged assault and kidnaping was first reported between 5:30 and 5:45 p.m.
(Filing No. 260 at CM/ECF p. 36; Filing No. 236-2, Attach. 1 at CM/ECF p. 4.)

6. Donald L. Carey ("Carey") was employed as
Chief of the OPD from August 1998 through June 2003.
(FilingNo. 236-13, Attach. 12 atCM/ECFp. 1.)

16. Szemplenski also testified that uniformed officers first responded to the original call at 5:45 p.m. (Filing
No. 260 at CM/ECF p. 26; Filing No. 236-3, Attach. 2 at
CM/ECF pp. 4-5.)

B. Blair's Arrest
7. On May 12, 1997, police officers Housh, [*7]
Truckenbrod, Scott and Christensen went to 2035 Maple
Street, in Omaha, Nebraska.
8. Upon arriving at 2035 Maple Street, the officers
found the front door open. Blair appeared in the doorway
and identified himself. The officers asked him to step
down from the doorway, patted him down and handcuffed him.

C. Blair's Trial

17. Christensen originally testified that he arrived at
Blair's residence "around 5:00 p.m." However, he later
stated that the time in his report, 8:00 p.m., would be the
correct time. (Filing No. 260 at CM/ECF p. 39.) Christensen's Uniform Patrol Bureau Daily Sheet indicates
that the original report occurred at "1730" (5:30 p.m.)
and that he was dispatched to Blair's [*9] residence at
2000 hours (8:00 p.m.). (Filing No. 236-5, Attach. 4 at
CM/ECF p. 8.)

9. The officers then became aware of the presence of
other people in the house. Scott, Christensen, and
Truckenbrod entered the house tlirough the open front
door.

18. Housh's Uniform Crime Report states that the
incident was reported at "1730-1745," (5:30-5:45 p.m.).
In addition, it provides that Blair was booked at "1800"
(6:00 p.m.). (Filing No. 236-2, Attach. 1 at CM/ECF pp.
6-7.)

10. Upon entering the house the officers observed
three men in the living room of the house. The officers
also saw a shotgun in plain view leaning against the wall
near the front door. The officers unloaded the shotgun
and secured it in the trunk of a police cruiser.

19. OPD's Supplementary Report of the incident,
prepared by Lisa Rankin, also states that the original
report occurred at "1745" (5:45 p.m.). (Filing No. 236-3,
Attach. 2 at CM/ECF pp. 6-20.)

11. The three men in the living room were staring
nervously at a large duffel bag in the middle of the room.
Because of this behavior, the officers moved the bag
beyond the men's reach. Christensen then opened the bag
and found a loaded rifle. He removed the rifle and secured it in a police cruiser.
12. After securing the rifle, Scott remained with the
three men in the living room, while Truckenbrod and
Christensen completed a brief walk-through of the rest of
the .[* 8] house.
13. Eventually, Plaintiff was arrested for the assault
and kidnaping of his ex-girlfriend Patty Dory ("Dory")
and taken from the scene to the OPD Central Station.
There, Housh turned Blair over to other police personnel.

20. OPD officers are trained regarding the "investigation of crimes, preparation of reports, . . . handling of
witnesses and evidence, . . . legal limits on police activities, . . . testimony in court and . . . necessity to be truthful and accurate." (Filing No. 238-2, Attach. 1 at
CM/ECF p. 2.)
21. However, phone records show that Dory first
called 911 to report the incident at 1832 (6:32 p.m.).
(FilingNo. 236-2, Attach. 1 at CM/ECF p. 4.)
22. Despite this time discrepancy, Blair was convicted of kidnaping, use of a deadly weapon to commit a
felony and terroristic threats and subsequently sentenced
on June 16, 1998. See State v. Blair, 14 Neb. Ct. App.
190, 707 N. W.2d 8, 11 (Neb. Ct App. 2005).
D. Blair's First Federal [* 10] Lawsuit
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23. On April 3, 2001, Blair filed his first lawsuit in
this court relating to his May 12, 1997, arrest. Blair filed
this suit against Szemplenski, Truckenbrod, Housh and
Christensen alleging that they violated his Fourth
Amendment rights by arresting him and searching his
residence without probable cause. (Case No.
4:01CV3065, Filing Nos. 1 and 6; Case No.
4:04CV3229, Filing No. 31 at CM/ECF pp. 6-10.) Specifically, Blair alleged that he was arrested before Dory
ever called 911 to report her allegations. (Case No.
4:01CV3065, Filing No. 6; Case No. 4:04CV3229, Filing
No. 31 at CM/ECF pp. 6-10.)
24. On June 26, 2001, United States Magistrate
Judge Kathleen A. Jadzemis conducted an initial review
of Blair's April 3, 2001, complaint and concluded that his
claims were barred by the "holding of Heck v. Humphrey:' 2 (Case No. 4:01CV3065, Filing No. 7; Case No.
4:04CV3229, Filing No. 31 at CM/ECF p. 22.) However,
because Judge Jadzemis was uncertain about whether
Blair's state conviction had been invalidated, she gave
him leave to file an amended complaint. (Id.)
2 As set forth by the Supreme Court in Preiser
v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 475, 93 S Ct. 1827, 36 L.
Ed 2d 439 (1973), and Heck v. Humphrey, 512
U.S. 477, 114 S. Ct. 2364, 129 L. Ed. 2d 383
(1994), [* 11] if success on the merits of a civil
rights claim would necessarily implicate the validity of a conviction or continued confinement of
a convicted state prisoner, the civil rights claim
must be preceded by a favorable outcome in habeas corpus or similar proceedings in a state or
federal forum. Absent such a favorable disposition of the charges or conviction, a plaintiff may
not use 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to cast doubt on the legality of his conviction or confinement. See Heck,
512 US. at 486-87.
25. Blair could not establish that his conviction had
been invalidated and the court dismissed his case on
November 16, 2001. (Case No. 4:01CV3065, Filing Nos.
10 and 11.)
26. On December 11, 2001, Blair appealed to the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. (Case No. 4:01CV3065,
Filing No. 12.) The Eighth Circuit affirmed the court's
decision on July 7, 2002. (Case No. 4:01CV3065, Filing
No. 24.)
E. Blair's State Court Post-Conviction Proceedings
27. On August 11,2003, the Nebraska District Court
set aside Blair's conviction on the basis of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel and ordered a new trial. State
v. Blair, 14 Neb. Ct. App. 190, 707 N.W.2d 8, 13 (Neb.
Ct. App. 2005).

28. The court specifically concluded that Blair's
[*12] defense counsel was ineffective in failing to produce witnesses at Blair's trial. Id.
F. Blair's Second Federal Lawsuit
29. On August 25, 2004, Blair filed his second complaint in this court relating to his May 12, 1997, arrest.
(Case No. 4:04CV3229, Filing No. 1.) Blair filed this
Complaint against the same police officers as his first
federal case, Case No. 4:01CV3065, but also added additional defendants. (Id.)
30. On July 26, 2006, United States District Judge
Richard Kopf stayed Blair's second case because he had
not yet been retried, and therefore, had not obtained a
final favorable outcome in his criminal case as contemplated by Heck. (Case No. 4:04CV3229, Filing No. 57 at
CM/ECF p. 7.) After entering the stay, the parties and the
court agreed to close the case provided that Blair could
reopen it upon the completion of his criminal proceedings in state court. (Case No. 4.04CV3229, Filing No. 59
at CM/ECF p. 2.)
G. Dismissal of the Charges Against Blair and His
Current Federal Lawsuit
31. Ultimately, the Douglas County Attorney decided to dismiss the charges against Blair instead of proceeding with a new trial. The County made this decision
for several reasons, including the fact [*13] that Blair
had already served approximately eight years in jail and
it was unlikely that a conviction would result in a substantial amount of additional incarceration. (Filing No.
236-14, Attach. 13 at CM/ECF pp. 3-4.)
32. On August 3, 2007, Blair filed his third, and
current, lawsuit in this court relating to his May 12,
1997, arrest. (Filing No. 1.) Although Blair did not move
to reopen his second case, Case No. 4:04CV3229, the
court permitted his claims to proceed as a new case in
accordance with the court's prior stay order. (Filing No.
15.)
///. CITY DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARYJUDGMENT
Blair's Complaint alleges seven separate causes of
action against the City Defendants. (Filing No. 16.) The
City Defendants argue they are entitled to summary
judgment on each of these claims. (Filing No. 237.) For
the reasons discussed below, the court agrees in part.
A. Standard of Review
Summary judgment should be granted only "if the
pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file,
and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as
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to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56(c).
See also Egan v. Wells Fargo Alarm Servs., 23 F.3d
I444t J446 (8th Cir. 1994). [*14] It is not the court's
function to weigh evidence in the summary judgment
record to determine the truth of any factual issue. Bell v.
Conopco, Inc., 186 F.3d 1099, 1101 (8th Cir. 1999). In
passing upon a motion for summary judgment, the district court must view the facts in the light most favorable
to the party opposing the motion. Dancy v. Hyster Co.,
121F.3d 649, 652 (8th Cir. 1997).
In order to withstand a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must substantiate the allegations with '"sufficient probative evidence [that] would
permit a finding in [their] favor on more than mere speculation, conjecture, or fantasy.'" Moody v. St. Charles
County, 23 F.3d 1410, 1412 (8th Cir. 1994) (quoting
Gregory v. City of Rogers, 974 F.2d 1006, 1010 (8th Cir.
1992)). "A mere scintilla of evidence is insufficient to
avoid summary judgment." Id. Essentially the test is
"whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement
to require submission to a jury or whether it is so
one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law."
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52,
106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L Ed. 2d 202 (1986).
B. Fourth Amendment Claims
The City Defendants argue that Blair's unlawful
search and seizure and [*15] unlawful arrest claims
(collectively the "Fourth Amendment Claims) are barred
by the statute of limitations. Alternatively, the City Defendants argue that the officers' actions were reasonable
and appropriate under the Fourth Amendment and they
are entitled to qualified immunity. As set forth below, the
court concludes that Blair's Fourth Amendment claims
are not barred by the statue of limitations. Further, there
are material questions of fact about whether the officers
had probable cause to arrest Blair or search his residence.
1. Statute of Limitations
Plaintiffs claims are brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983. (Filing No. 81.) "The applicable state law statute
of limitations governs § 1983 claims." Baker v. Chisom,
501 F.3d 920, 922 (8th Cir. 2007) (affirming dismissal).
In Nebraska, there is a four-year statute of limitations
that applies to suits brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-207\ See Poor Bear v. Nesbitt,
300 F. Supp. 2d 904, 912-13 (D. Neb. 2004) (affirming
dismissal of § 1983 claim that alleged, among other
things, an improper arrest because the four-year statute
of limitations found in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-207 had run)
(quoting Bauers v. City of Lincoln, 245 Neb. 632, 514
N.W.2d 625, 634 (Neb. 1994) [*16] which relied upon

Bridgeman v. Nebraska State Pen, 849 F2d 1076, 1077
(8th Cir. 1988)).
As discussed above, Blair's arrest and search of his
residence occurred on May 12, 1997. Thus, Blair was
required to file his Fourth Amendment claims by May
12,2001. Because Blair filed this case on August 3,2007
(filing no. L), his Fourth Amendment claims are barred
unless the statute of limitations is somehow tolled by the
particularized circumstances of this case. Blair argues
that statute of limitations should be tolled in this case
because he originally filed his Fourth Amendment claims
on April 3, 2001 (see case no. 4:01CV3065, filing nos. 1
and 6; case no. 4:04CV3229, filing no. 31 at CM/ECF p.
6-10), but was prevented from pursuing them because the
court determined that they were barred under the principles of Heck. Stated another way, Blair argues that he is
entitled to equitable tolling.
"Generally, a litigant seeking equitable tolling bears
the burden of establishing two elements: (1) that he has
been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some
extraordinary circumstance stood in his way." Riddle v.
Kemna, 523 F.3d 850, 857 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting
Walker v. Norris, 436 F3d 1026, 1032 (8th Cir. 2006))\
[*17] see also Baker v. Chisom, 501 F.3d 920, 925 (8th
Cir. 2007) (addressing equitable tolling of a § 1983
claim). In this case, Blair timely filed his first lawsuit on
April 3, 2001, alleging search and seizure claims related
to his May 12, 1997, arrest. However, his complaint was
dismissed because the court concluded his claims were
barred by Heck. Blair then appealed this decision, but the
Eighth Circuit affirmed. (Case No. 4:01CV3065, Filing
Nos. 12 and 24.)
After his conviction was set aside, Blair filed a second lawsuit in this court realleging his Fourth Amendment claims. However, because Blair had not yet been
retried, and therefore had not obtained a final favorable
outcome in his criminal case as contemplated by Heck,
the court elected to stay the case. (Case No.
4:04CV3229, Filing No. 57 at CM/ECF p. 7.) Ultimately,
the parties and the court agreed to close the case so long
as Blair could reopen it upon the completion of his criminal proceedings in state court. (Case No. 4:04CV3229,
Filing No. 59 at CM/ECF p. 2.) Blair has since established that his criminal proceedings are over and his current Complaint seeks to litigate the Fourth Amendment
claims he first alleged in Case No. [*18] 4:01CV3065,
and re-alleged in Case No 4:04CV3229.
Overall, it is clear that Blair has been pursuing his
rights diligently. In addition, the court has prevented him
from resolving his claims as it has twice determined that
they were barred by Heck. In light of this, the court finds
that the statute of limitations was tolled with respect to
Blair's Fourth Amendment claims against the Defendants
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he sued in his first lawsuit: Housh, Truckenbrod, Christensen and Scott.3
3
To the extent that Blair alleges his Forth
Amendment claims against any other Defendants,
his claims are not tolled. Blair's first case, Case
No. 4.01CV3065, only alleged Fourth Amendment claims against Housh, Truckenbrod, Christensen and Scott. (See Filing No. 4:04CV3229,
Filing No. 31 at CM/ECF pp. 3-11.)
2. Fourth Amendment
Because the statute of limitations was tolled with
respect to Blair's Fourth Amendment claims against
Housh, Truckenbrod, Christensen and Scott, the court
will now explore the merits of those claims. "The Fourth
Amendment prohibits a warrantless entry of a home by
law enforcement officers unless the circumstances are
within a reasonableness exception to the warrant requirement." US. v. Clarke, 564 F3d 949, 958-59 (8th
Cir. 2009). [*19] However, the Eighth Circuit has recognized a "reasonableness exception to the warrant requirement which allows a non-consensual, warrantless
search of a home if the search is supported by probable
cause and exigent circumstances." Id. at 959; see also
United States v. Hogan, 539 F3d 916, 922 (8th Cir.
2008). When examining if a search is reasonable, courts
consider "all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen's personal security." Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19, 88 S Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889
(1968).
In addition, "[i]t is well established that a warrantless arrest without probable cause violates an individual's
constitutional rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments." Hannah v. City of Overland, Mo., 795
F2d 1385, 1389 (8th Cir. 1986). "An officer has probable cause to arrest a suspect without a warrant if the 'facts
and circumstances within the officer's knowledge . . . are
sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown,
that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about
to commit an offense.'" Arnott v. Mataya, 995 F.2d 121,
124 (8th Cir. 1993) (quoting Michigan v. DeFillippo,
443 US. 31, 37, 99 S. Ct 2627, 61 L. Ed. 2d 343
(1979)). [*20] The fact that an arrested person is later
found innocent is not material. Arnott, 995 F2dat 124.
Here, Housh, Truckenbrod, Christensen and Scott
did not have a warrant to arrest Blair or search his home.
However, they argue they had probable cause because
they relied in good faith on Dory's report that Blair had
held her captive at gunpoint and assaulted her. (Filing
No. 237 at CM/ECF pp. 19-20.) The record indicates that
Dory called 911 to report these allegations on May 12,

1997, at 6:32 p.m. (Filing No. 16; Filing No. 236-15,
Attach. 14 at CM/ECF p. 1.)
In contrast, Blair argues that he was arrested before
Dory ever called 911, and therefore, the officers did not
have probable cause to arrest him or search his home.
(Filing No. 258 at CM/ECF pp. 8-13.) Blair uses several
sources of evidence to support this argument. First, Blair
submitted sworn affidavits from two individuals that
witnessed the officers at his residence at approximately
5;00 p.m. on May 12, 1997, and a sworn affidavit from
his mother stating that she received a call at 5:30 on May
12, 1997, informing her that her son had been arrested.
(Filing No. 260 at CM/ECF pp. 4-8, 14-15.)
Second, Blair points to the officers' [*21] police
reports, which indicate that the original report occurred
on May 12, 1997, between 5:30 and 5:45 p.m. and that
Blair was booked on May 12, 1997, at 6:00 p.m. (Filing
No. 236-3, Attach. 2 at CM/ECF pp. 6-20; Filing No.
236-5, Attach. 4 at CM/ECF p. 6; Filing No. 236-2, Attach. 1 at CM/ECF p. 7.)
Third, Blair points to the trial testimony of Housh,
Szemplenski and Christensen. These officers all testified
that they arrived at Blair's residence between 5:00 and
5:45 p.m. (Filing No. 236-2, Attach. 1 at CM/ECF pp. 4;
Filing No. 236-3, Attach. 2 at CM/ECF pp. 4-5; Filing
No. 260 at CM/ECF p. 26, 36, 39.) Overall, this evidence
supports Blair's argument that he was arrested well before Dory's 6:32 p.m. call to 911.
The City Defendants argue that the time discrepancies in the officers' reports were mistakes and.that the
officers accidentally based their trial testimony on these
mistakes. (Filing No. 237 at CM/ECF p. 27; Filing No.
236-2, Attach. 1 at CM/ECF pp. 1-4; Filing No. 236-3,
Attach. 2 at CM/ECF pp. 3-5.) Although this argument
may have merit, a genuine issue of material fact remains
as to whether the officers were aware of Dory's report at
the time of Blair's arrest. The parties [*22] have presented two vastly different stories as to when Blair was
arrested and it is not the court's place to decide who is
telling the truth at this stage of the proceedings. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 US. 242, 255, 106 S.
Ct. 2505, 91L. Ed 2d 202 (1986) ("In ruling on a motion
for summary judgment a court must not weigh evidence
or make credibility determinations."). Viewing the facts
in a light most favorable to Blair, a jury could find that
he suffered a constitutional violation by being subjected
to a search and arrest without probable cause.4
4 There is nothing else before the court showing that the officers had any other basis for probable cause, or that any exigent circumstances existed to arrest Blair.
3. Qualified Immunity
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The City Defendants also summarily argue that they
are entitled to qualified immunity on Blair's Fourth
Amendment claims. (Filing No. 237 at CM/ECF pp.
40-43.) "Because the qualified immunity privilege extends to a police officer who is wrong, so long as he is
reasonable, the governing standard for a Fourth Amendment unlawful arrest claim 'is not probable cause in fact
but arguable probable cause . . . that is, whether the officer should have known that the arrest violated plaintiffs [*23] clearly established right.'" Walker v. City of
Pine Bluff 414 F3d 989, 992 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting
Habiger v. City of Fargo, 80 F3d 289, 295 (8th Cir.
1996)).
As discussed above, a question of fact remains as to
whether the officers had probable cause to arrest Blair
and search his home. In addition, the officers should
have known that arresting Blair and searching his home
without probable cause would violate his clearly established rights. See, e.g., Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305,
308, 117 S. Ct. 1295, 137 L. Ed. 2d 513 (1997) (reiterating that warrantless seizures generally violate the Fourth
Amendment absent an individualized reasonable suspicion determination); Hannah v. City of Overland, Mo.,
795 F.2d 1385, 1389 (8th Cir. 1986) ("It is well established that a warrantless arrest without probable cause
violates an individual's constitutional rights under the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments."). Thus, the officers are not entitled to qualified immunity on Blair's
Fourth Amendment claims.
C. State Law Claims
In addition to his Fourth Amendment claims, Blabhas alleged several state law claims against the City Defendants including false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, abuse of process and loss [*24] of
consortium. As set forth below, the City Defendants are
entitled to summary judgment on each of these claims.
1. False Arrest, False Imprisonment, Malicious
Prosecution and Abuse of Process
The Nebraska Political Subdivisions Tort Claims
Act ("NPSTCA"), Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 13-901 to 13-926,
generally allows political subdivisions to be held liable
for tort claims. Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 13-902, 13-903(3). In
addition, the NPSTCA is the sole method to assert a tort
claim against a political subdivision under Nebraska law.
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 13-902.
However, the NPSTCA limits the types of actions
that may be brought against a political subdivision and
its employees in their official capacity. In particular, the
NPSTCA does not allow a political subdivision or its
employees to be sued "for any claims arising out of. . .
false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution,
[or] abuse of process
" Neb. Rev. Stat. § 13-910(7).

Accordingly, the court finds the NPSTCA bars Blair's
state law claims for false imprisonment, malicious prosecution and abuse of process against the City Defendants
in their official capacities.
Blair also asserts his false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious [*25] prosecution, and abuse of process against the City Defendants in their individual capacities. Nebraska courts have consistently held that a
political subdivision's employee cannot be sued individually if the alleged tortious conduct occurred while the
employee acted within the scope of the employee's employment. Bohl v. Buffalo County, 251 Neb. 492, 557
NW.2d 668, 673 (Neb. 1997); Kuchar v. Krings, 248
Neb. 995, 540 NW.2d582, 585 (Neb. 1995); Edington v.
City of Omaha, Nos. A-98-205 & A-98-206, 1999 Neb.
App. LEXIS 249, 1999 WL 703294, at *4-*5 (Neb. Ct.
App. Sept. 7, 1999).
Here, Blair does not allege that the employees were
acting outside the scope of their employment. In fact,
Blair's Amended Complaint specifically states that the
City Defendants were acting either under color of law or
within the scope of their employment, or both. (Filing
No. 16 at CM/ECF pp. 2-3, 6, 7.) Accordingly, Blair's
false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution
and abuse of process claims against the City Defendants
in their individual capacities must also be dismissed.
2. Loss of Consortium
Blair also alleges that he has been deprived of the
consortium of his family members. (Id. at CM/ECF p.
18.) Blair is confused about his loss of consortium
[*26] claim. In Nebraska, loss of consortium is a claim
that accrues to an injured person's spouse and not to the
injured person himself. Simms v. Vicorp Restaurants,
Inc., 272 Neb. 744, 725 NW.2d 406, 409 (Neb. 2006)
("[W]hen a married person is injured, two causes of action arise: one accrues to the injured person for the injuries suffered directly by him or her, and the other accrues
to the injured person's spouse for damages suffered as a
result of the loss of the injured person's services, society,
companionship, and sexual relations (loss of consortium)."). Because Blair only alleges claims against the
City Defendants for injuries to himself, his loss of consortium claim lacks merit and must be dismissed.
D. Claims Against Skinner, Carey and the City of
Omaha
In addition to his Fourth Amendment and state law
claims, Blair also alleges § 1983 claims against the City
of Omaha and former Omaha Police Chiefs Skinner and
Carey for failing to properly train their officers. Blair
sues Skinner and Carey in both their individual and official capacities. The City Defendants argue that these
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claims should be dismissed because they are deficient.
(Filing No. 237 at CM/ECF pp. 43-48.) The court agrees.
1. Official [*27] Capacity Claims Against Skinner
andCarey
"A suit against a public official in his official capacity is actually a suit against the entity for which the official is an agent." Elder-Keep v. Aksamit, 460 F.3d 979,
986 (8th Cir. 2006) (citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473
U.S. 159, 165, 105 S. Ct. 3099, 87 L. Ed. 2d 114 (1985)).
Thus, to sustain the action against Skinner and Carey in
their official capacities, Blair must prove that the City
"itself caused the constitutional violation at issue." Id.
(quotation omitted). As a municipal defendant, the City
of Omaha may only be liable under § 1983 if its "policy"
or "custom" caused a violation of Blair's constitutional
rights. Doe By & Through Doe v. Washington County,
150 F.3d 920, 922 (8th Cir. 1998) (citing Monell v. Depft
ofSoc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S Ct. 2018, 56 L.
Ed. 2d 611 (1978)). An "official policy" involves a deliberate choice to follow a course of action made from
among various alternatives by an official who has the
final authority to establish governmental policy. Jane
Doe A By & Through Jane Doe B v. Special School Dist.
of St. Louis County, 901 K2d 642, 645 (8th Cir. 1990)
(citing Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483,
106 S Ct. 1292, 89 L. Ed. 2d 452 (1986)).
To establish the existence of a governmental
custom, a plaintiff must prove:

[*28]

1) The existence of a continuing,
widespread, persistent pattern of unconstitutional misconduct by the governmental entity's employees;
2) Deliberate indifference to or tacit
authorization of such conduct by the governmental entity's policymaking officials
after notice to the officials of that misconduct; and
3) That plaintiff was injured by acts
pursuant to the governmental entity's custom, i.e., that the custom was the moving
force behind the constitutional violation.

Jane Doe, 901 F.2d at 646.
Here, Blair generally alleges that Skinner and Carey
"had a duty to properly train, supervise, and discipline"
officers, but instead they let them "run amuck." (Filing
No. 16 at CM/ECF p. 7.) He also alleges that Skinner
and Carey were aware of his "unlawful arrest," but they
refused to do anything about it. (Id.) However, Blair does
not allege that the City of Omaha has a custom of failing

to train, supervise or discipline its officers, nor does Blair
allege that any custom was the moving force behind his
injuries. Consequently, Blair has failed to properly allege
an official capacity claim against Skinner or Carey under
the Jane Doe standard and his official capacity [*29]
claims against them must be dismissed.
2. City of Omaha
Beyond Blair's official capacity claims against
Skinner and Carey, Blair's Amended Complaint contains
very few allegations against the City of Omaha itself. For
example, Blair claims that the City of Omaha "[set] his
bond at an amount far above what the law requires" and
is "liable for the actions of [its] officers." (Filing No. 16
at CM/ECF pp. 6, 16.) The court finds that these allegations also fail specify a City policy or custom that violated Blair's constitutional rights. Therefore, Blair's
claims against the City of Omaha also must be dismissed.
3. Individual Capacity Claims Against Skinner and
Carey
As discussed above, Blair also alleges his claims
against Skinner and Carey in their individual capacities.
The Eighth Circuit has held that a supervising officer can
be liable for an junior officer's constitutional violation
only "'if he directly participated in the constitutional violation, or if his failure to train or supervise the offending
actor caused the deprivation.'" Otey v. Marshall, 121
F.3d 1150, 1155 (8th Cir. 1997) (quoting Tilson v. Forrest City Police Dep't, 28 F3d 802, 806 (8th Cir. 1994));
see also Wever v. Lincoln County, 388 F.3d 601, 606-07
(8th Cir. 2004).
However, [*30] a supervising officer will not be
individually liable for an otherwise unlawful act if he is
entitled to qualified immunity. Qualified immunity is a
question of law to be determined by the court and should
ordinarily be decided long before trial. Hunter v. Bryant,
502 U.S. 224, 228, 112 S. Ct. 534, 116 L. Ed 2d 589
(1991). "Public officials, of course, are entitled to qualified immunity from liability for damages under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 if 'their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.'" Domina v. Van
Pelt, 235 F.3d 1091, 1096 (8th Cir. 2000) (citing Harlow
v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 73 L.
Ed. 2d 396 (1982)). In short, "qualified immunity shields
a defendant from suit if he or she could have reasonably
believed his or her conduct to be lawful in light of clearly
established law and the information [that the defendant]
possessed." Smithson v. Aldrich, 235 F.3d 1058, 1061
(8th Cir. 2000) (citations and quotations omitted). "The
qualified immunity standard gives ample room for mistaken judgments by protecting all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Id. (cita-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Page 9
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19365, *

tions and quotations omitted). Moreover, qualified immunity [*31] is "the usual rule" and state actors will
enjoy qualified immunity in all but "exceptional cases."
Foy v. Holston, 94 F.3d 1528, 1532 (11th Cir. 1996).
The court focuses on two questions to determine
whether a state official is entitled to qualified immunity:
"(1) whether, after viewing the facts in the light most
favorable to the party asserting the injury, there was a
deprivation of a constitutional or statutory right; and, if
so, (2) whether the right was clearly established at the
time of the deprivation such that a reasonable official
would understand that their conduct was unlawful . . . ."
Henderson v. Munn, 439 F.3d 497, 501 (8th Cir. 2006)
(citations and quotations omitted).
As discussed above, Blair's allegations against
Skinner and Carey are not based on direct participation,
but rather relate to an alleged failure to "properly train,
supervise, and discipline" officers. (Filing No. 16 at
CM/ECF p. 7.) However, "a supervisory officer is entitled to qualified immunity for a § 1983 failure to train
action unless a reasonable supervisor would have known
that his training program (or lack thereof) was likely to
result in the specific constitutional violation at issue."
Parrish v. Ball, Nos. 08-3517, 08-3518, 594 F3d 993,
2010 US. App. LEXIS 2748, 2010 WL 445736, at *8 (8th
Cir. Feb. 10, 2010); [*32] see also Gold v. City of Miami, 121 F3d 1442, 1447 (11th Cir. 1997) (noting that a
supervisor is entitled to qualified immunity unless "a
reasonable person in the supervisor's position would have
known that his conduct infringed the constitutional rights
of the plaintiff and his conduct was causally related to
the constitutional violation committed by his subordinate" (quotation omitted)).
Even when the record is viewed in a light most favorable to Blair, it does not suggest that Skinner or Carey
would have known that their training programs and policies would likely result in Blair's alleged constitutional
violations. In fact, the record indicates that the OPD's
training program includes "intensive" training on the
"investigation of crimes, preparation of reports, . . . handling of witnesses and evidence, . . . legal limits on police activities,. . . testimony in court and . . . necessity to
be truthful and accurate." (Filing No. 238-2, Attach. 1 at
CM/ECF pp. 1-2.) Blair has presented no evidence to
show that this training program or OPD's policies are
inadequate. In light of these findings, Skinner and Carey
are entitled to qualified immunity for Blair's claims
against them in [*33] their individual capacities.
E. Conspiracy Claims
Last, Blair alleges Osier and Morgan conspired with
other state actors to violate his rights. Blair brings these

conspiracy claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and
1985.
In order to establish a conspiracy claim under 42
U.S.C § 1983, Blair must prove "that the defendant
conspired with others to deprive him or her of a constitutional right; that at least one of the alleged
co-conspirators engaged in an overt act in furtherance of
the conspiracy; and that the overt act injured the plaintiff." Askew v. Millerd, 191 F3d 953, 957 (8th Cir.
1999). In order to establish a conspiracy claim under 42
U.S.C § 1985, Blair must prove: (1) the defendants conspired, (2) with the intent to deprive him of a constitutional right, (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy,
and (4) an injury to his person or property, or a deprivation of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United
States. Barstad v. Murray County, 420 F.3d 880, 887
(8th Cir. 2005).
"A conspiracy claim requires evidence of specific
facts that show a 'meeting of minds1 among conspirators." Id. (quoting Rogers v. Bruntrager, 841 F.2d 853,
856 (8th Cir. 1988)). Because a corporation [*34] and
its agents are a single entity in the eyes of the law, a
corporation cannot conspire with itself. Cross v. General
Motors Corp., 721 F2d 1152, 1156 (8th Cir. 1983). The
Eighth Circuit has extended this concept to government
entities. See Runs After v. United States, 766 F.2d 347,
354 (8th Cir. 1985); Richmond v. Bd. of Regents, 957
F.2d 595, 598 (8th Cir. 1992). However, an exception
arises where individual defendants "act outside the scope
of their employment for personal reasons." Garza v. City
of Omaha, 814 F.2d553, 556 (8th Cir. 1987).
Here, Blair alleges Osier conspired with "other state
actors" to manufacture false evidence and Morgan conspired "with other state actors" to testify falsely.5 (Filing
No. 16 at CM/ECF pp. 12-16.) Blair does not identify
who the "other state actors" are, nor does he allege that
Osier and Morgan were acting outside of the scope of
their employment. Rather, Blair alleges that Osier and
Morgan acted under color of law at all times. (Id. at
CM/ECF p. 3.) Moreover, Blair's Amended Complaint
and Brief are replete with speculation and conclusory
statements regarding a conspiracy, but nowhere does he
allege any facts to establish the necessary "meeting
[*35] of the minds" between these Defendants and a
person not employed by the City of Omaha. Because
Blair's evidence and claims show only that the alleged
conspirators were employed by the same entity, and because there is no allegation or reason to believe that the
alleged conspirators were acting outside the scope of
their employment, Blair cannot establish the existence of
a conspiracy-a single entity cannot conspire with itself.
In light of these findings, the court finds that Osier and
Morgan are entitled to summary judgment on Blair's
conspiracy claims.
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5 Blair also alleges Paul Koltz ("Koltz") conspired to manufacture false evidence. (Filing No.
16 at CM/ECF p. 12.) However, because Blair
failed to serve Koltz, Blair's claims against Koltz
were dismissed on April 10, 2009. (Filing No.
167.)
In sum, the City Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment is granted in part and denied in part. Blair's
only remaining claims are his Fourth Amendment Claims
against Housh, Truckenbrod, Scott and Christensen. The
court will enter a separate progression order progressing
this matter to trial.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that:
1. The City Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (filing no. 235) is granted [*36] in part and denied
in part.
2. Blair's Claims against Patricia Osier, Jeffrey
Morgan, Lawrence Reynard, Morgan Larson, James

Skinner, Donald Carey, City of Omaha, and Randy
Szemplenski are dismissed with prejudice.
3. A separate order will be entered progressing this
matter to trial.
DATED this 3rd day of March, 2010.
BY THE COURT:
Isi Joseph F. Bataillon
Chief United States District Judge
* This opinion may contain hyperlinks to other
documents or Web sites. The U.S. District Court for the
District of Nebraska does not endorse, recommend, approve, or guarantee any third parties or the services or
products they provide on their Web sites. Likewise, the
court has no agreements with any of these third parties or
their Web sites. The court accepts no responsibility for
the availability or functionality of any hyperlink. Thus,
the fact that a hyperlink ceases to work or directs the user
to some other site does not affect the opinion of the
court.
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